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ABSTRACT 
 
VOLATILITY COSTS OF INFLATION TARGETING:  
ANALYSIS OF NINE INFLATION TARGETING COUNTRIES  
Doğan, Gönül 
M.A., Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Assistant Professor Taner Yiğit 
 
August 2004 
 
This thesis tries to investigate the impact of inflation targeting as a monetary 
policy on the volatility of output and inflation, interest rate, exchange rate, and 
money growth in the nine countries that adopted inflation targeting prior to 1994: 
Australia, Canada, Chile, Finland, Israel, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden and United 
Kingdom. The thesis also compares four inflation targeting countries to non-
inflation-targeters to figure out the relative effectiveness of inflation targeting as a 
monetary policy. Structural break tests are made on the monetary aggregates. The 
main finding of the thesis is, inflation targeting countries well managed to improve 
their performance in terms of the volatilities of monetary aggregates. Despite the fact 
that there are upward movements in the volatilities of monetary aggregates at the 
time of the regime shift, after the adoption of inflation targeting, in general, the 
volatilities declined. However, there isn’t any clear pattern of how inflation targeting 
countries perform relative to the benchmark countries. 
 iv 
ÖZET 
 
ENFLASYON HEDEFLEMESİNİN MALİYETİ: 
ENFLASYON HEDEFLEMESİ UYGULAYAN DOKUZ ÜLKENİN ANALİZİ 
Doğan, Gönül 
Master, İktisat Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Taner Yiğit 
 
Ağustos 2004 
 
  Bu çalışma, bir para politikası olan enflasyon hedeflemesinin, üretim, 
enflasyon, faiz oranları, parasal büyüme ve döviz kuru değişkelerine olan etkisini 
incelemektedir. İncelenen dokuz ülke 1994’ten once enflasyon hedeflemesine geçmiş 
olan Avustralya, Kanada, Şili, Finlandiya, İsrail, Yeni Zelanda, İspanya, İsveç ve 
Birleşik Krallık’tır. Ayrıca bu dokuz ülkeden dördü enflasyon hedeflemesi 
uygulamayan dört ülkeyle karşılaştırılarak, enflasyon hedeflemesinin diğer para 
politikalarına oranla ne derece etkili olduğu saptanmaya çalışılmıştır. Üretim, 
enflasyon, faiz oranları, parasal büyüme ve döviz kuru verilerine yapısal değişim 
testleri uygulanmıştır. Tezin temel bulgusu, enflasyon hedeflemesi uygulayan 
ülkelerin, makroekomik göstergelerin değişkesi ölçüt alındığında performaslarını 
iyileştirmiş olduklarıdır. Enflasyon hedeflemesine geçiş sürecinde bahsi geçen 
makroekonomik göstergelerin değişkelerinde artışlar olmuş olsa da, enflasyon 
hedeflemesine geçildikten sonar değişkeler genelde düşmüştür. Fakat, enflasyon 
 v 
hedeflemesi uygulayan ülkelerin uygulamayanlarla karşılaştırılması sonucunda 
enflasyon hedeflemesinin göreceli başarısına karar verilememiştir. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
After initial adoption by New Zealand in 1990, inflation targeting has been 
the choice of a growing number of central banks in industrial and emerging 
economies. Many more countries are considering future adoption of this new 
monetary framework. Mishkin and Hebbel (2001) count eighteen countries that have 
adopted inflation targeting by 2000. The earliest countries to adopt inflation targeting 
are New Zealand in 1990, Chile and Canada in 1991, Israel and United Kingdom in 
1992, Sweden and Finland in 1993 and Spain and Australia in 1994.  
Inflation targeting is a relatively new monetary regime that has been and is 
increasingly being adopted by central banks. There is an ongoing debate on the 
benefits and costs of inflation targeting and some theoretical and empirical studies 
try to investigate whether inflation targeting is better than monetary targeting. The 
studies on inflation targeting are mainly concerned with the effects of inflation 
targeting on output variability and the relation between inflation and output 
volatility. In this thesis, we try to investigate the impact of inflation targeting not 
only on the volatility of output and inflation but also on interest rate, exchange rate, 
and money growth in the nine countries that adopted inflation targeting until 1994: 
Australia, Canada, Chile, Finland, Israel, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden and United 
Kingdom. We also compare four inflation targeting countries to non-inflation-
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targeters to figure out the relative effectiveness of inflation targeting as a monetary 
policy. 
The inflation targeting countries studied in this thesis vary in terms of target 
price index, target width and horizon, accountability of target misses and overall 
transparency and accountability regarding conduct of policy under inflation 
targeting. Despite these differences in implementation features, there is a consensus 
on the pillars of inflation targeting. Mishkin and Savastano (2000) define inflation 
targeting as a monetary policy strategy that includes five main elements: 1. the public 
announcement of numerical inflation targets, 2. commitment to price stability as the 
primary goal of monetary policy; 3. an information-inclusive strategy in which many 
variables and not just monetary aggregates or the exchange rate are used for setting 
the policy instruments; 4. a transparent monetary policy in which communicating 
with the public about objectives and the rationale for the decisions of the central 
bank plays a central role; 5. central bank accountability for attaining its inflation 
objectives. These pillars make inflation targeting much more than a public 
announcement of numerical targets for inflation. Inflation targeting is easily 
understood by the public and thus is highly transparent and an explicit numerical 
target for inflation increases the accountability of the central bank and allows the 
central bank to focus on controlling inflation. Also, stability in the relationship 
between monetary aggregates and inflation is not crucial to its success. Despite its 
advantages such as increased transparency and accountability for central bank 
actions, there are also concerns regarding the problems that inflation targeting may 
cause. 
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There is an ongoing debate on the costs of inflation targeting and whether 
inflation targeting is better than monetary targeting. The studies on inflation targeting 
are mainly concerned with the effects of inflation targeting on output variability and 
the relation between inflation and output volatility. A number of studies summarize 
the experience gained with inflation targeting. Bernanke et al (1999), Mishkin and 
Hebbel (2001), Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999) are the most prominent ones. There 
are theoretical studies that compare inflation targeting with other monetary regimes, 
in most cases monetary targeting. Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Svensson 
(1998) basically search for the optimality of inflation targeting rules and are 
concerned with output gap and inflation volatility. Similarly, Callum and Nelson 
(1999) try to investigate the optimality of different monetary policies, Levin et al. 
(1999) search for the relation between interest rate volatility and inflation-output 
volatihity. Ball (1999) searches for optimal rules for open economies and shows how 
exchange rate can affect the inflation-output variability relation. Rotemberg and 
Woodford (1999) search for the tradeoff between inflation and output gap variability 
within the framework of Taylor rules. 
There are two particular differences of this thesis other than the works in the 
literature. First, the method in searching for volatility changes is different. In the 
literature, mainly Taylor rules and vector autoregression models are used to calculate 
the variability of inflation and output in inflation targeting countries.  We do not 
estimate a theoretical model to explain the effects of inflation targeting on the 
monetary aggregates. We included these theoretical models in Chapter 2 and they 
serve as a benchmark for analysis. Instead of forming a policy model and estimating 
the parameters of that model, we analyse the monetary aggregates and search for the 
 4 
existence of structural changes in the volatilities of these monetary aggregates. We 
make structural break tests. The results tell us whether there is a structural break in 
the monetary aggregate analysed as well as what the effect of the structural break is 
if there exists one. We also interpret these changes and try to figure out whether the 
changes in volatility are the results of the changes in the level or not. This is 
particularly important for output growth and inflation volatilities since it is desirable 
to have a high level of output growth with a low volatility and a low level of inflation 
with a low volatility. However, a decline in output volatility might be the 
consequence of a decline in output growth and a decline in the level of inflation not 
always implies a decline in the volatility of inflation.  
The second difference of this thesis from the studies in the inflation targeting 
literature is, we not only look at the changes in inflation, output and interest rate 
variability but also search for changes in exchange rate and money variability. Since 
there are no empirical studies on especially the volatility of exchange rates and 
money in inflation targeting countries, the results provide important insights on 
whether inflation targeting central banks excessively use money and exchange rate to 
control inflation and whether this can be attributed to the introduction of inflation 
targeting. The interest rate volatility results when considered together with output-
inflation volatilities explain whether inflation targeting central banks sacrifice from 
interest rate volatility to create a more efficient inflation-output variability trade-off 
if they could have created one. The countries that we analyze are the first nine 
countries that adopted inflation targeting; Australia, Canada, Chile, Finland, Israel, 
New Zealand, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. We compare the results of 
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Canada with United States, United Kingdom with France, Sweden with Denmark and 
Finland with Norway. 
The main finding is, inflation targeting countries well managed to improve 
their performance in terms of the volatilities of monetary aggregates. Despite the fact 
that there are upward movements in the volatilities of monetary aggregates at the 
time of the regime shift in inflation targeting countries, after the adoption of inflation 
targeting, in general, the volatilities declined. After the adoption of inflation 
targeting, the most notable declines are in the volatilities of exchange rates and 
interest rates. While there aren’t increases in inflation and production growth 
volatility in any of the countries analyzed, there are decreases in inflation and 
production growth volatility in some of the countries. Furthermore, producing 
decreased inflation and output volatility does not come with the cost of increased 
interest rate volatility or exchange rate volatility. This suggests that inflation 
targeting countries well managed to control inflation without using interest rates and 
exchange rates excessively. The results on the relationship between the volatilities 
and the levels of monetary aggregates are mixed. All inflation targeting countries 
managed stable low inflations and interest rates but not all of them managed to 
sustain high output growth levels. The results on the levels of exchange rates and 
money growth rates are inconclusive.  
When we compare Canada with U.S., we see that Canada does not perform as 
well as U.S. in terms of volatilities before and after the introduction of inflation 
targeting except for exchange rate. After the introduction of inflation targeting 
Canada successfully achieves a lower CPI inflation than the U.S. and also the 
differences between the levels of interest rate and production growth in Canada and 
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U.S. are either declining or negative which implies that the relative performance of 
Canada has been improving after the adoption of inflation targeting. For Finland 
there is a change in trend when compared to Norway after the introduction of 
inflation targeting. Production growth is bigger and interest rate and inflation levels 
are smaller when compared to Norway after the introduction of inflation targeting. 
Production growth volatility and interest rate volatility are smaller but inflation 
volatility and exchange rate volatility are usually higher than in Norway. When 
Sweden is compared to Denmark, it is seen that after Sweden introduced inflation 
targeting, Sweden has a lower inflation level than Denmark with a higher volatility. 
Moreover, Sweden manages to have a higher production growth with a lower 
volatility than Denmark however interest rates do not follow the decline in inflation. 
After inflation targeting is implemented, Sweden has also lower volatility in interest 
rates and money growth but lower volatilities cannot be safely attributed to the 
regime change. Exchange rate is more volatile in Sweden at all times. When we 
compare U.K. with France, we find that the volatility and the level of inflation is 
almost always lower in the U.K. before and after inflation targeting, exchange rate is 
always more volatile in U.K., money growth is always more volatile in France. After 
the introduction of inflation targeting in U.K. there is a clear evidence of declining 
production and interest rate volatility, however production growth level is also lower 
in the U.K. especially after mid-1996 and the relative interest rate volatility increases 
after mid-1996.  
So, the results clearly suggest that inflation targeting countries successfully 
lowered their inflation levels below the benchmark countries’ inflation levels. 
However, except U.K. inflation volatilities are higher in inflation targeting countries. 
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Sweden and Finland manage to sustain high production growth levels with low 
production growth volatilities compared to the benchmark countries but this is not 
the case for U.K. and Canada. Interest rate level differences are declining in Canada 
and Finland but not in the U.K. and Canada. There is a relative improvement in 
interest rate volatility after the regime change in all countries except Canada. 
Exchange rate is always more volatile in the inflation targeting countries. Money 
growth is less volatile in the U.K., Sweden and Finland but not in Canada. So there 
isn’t any clear pattern of how inflation targeting countries perform relative to the 
benchmark countries and the relative success of the regime changes from one 
country to another. 
The remainder of the thesis is as follows: in the first chapter we discuss the 
literature on inflation targeting that investigate the impacts of inflation targeting on 
inflation, output, exchange rate and interest rate volatility. In chapter 2, we give 
examples of the theoretical models used to analyze the impacts inflation targeting. 
These models are simplified versions of the policies that inflation targeting central 
banks use to conduct monetary policy. The models are chosen to reflect the effects of 
inflation targeting on the variability of output, interest rates and exchange rate. The 
models do not include money because especially after the leading work of Taylor 
(1993) money is not used as an instrument to set up monetary policy. Instead, interest 
rate is used in response to output, inflation and exchange rate. In chapter 3 we 
explain the data and methodology that we use in the thesis and give a brief overview 
of Bai and Perron (2003) structural break test. In chapter 4, we explain the results 
from the structural break point tests made for the nine inflation targeting countries as 
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well as the comparisons of inflation targeting countries with the four benchmark 
countries. Chapter 5 briefly concludes. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Literature on inflation targeting 
 
To investigate the impacts of a monetary policy, its effects on monetary 
aggregates must be explored. Generally, changes in standard deviations, rather than 
changes in average levels, are used to analyse the effects of a monetary policy. The 
most analysed changes are those of inflation variability and output variability. 
Recently, there are also studies including interest rates since variability in interest 
rates is a signal of central bank credibility and increased variability of interest rates 
can make small open economies vulnerable to financial crisis. Exchange rate 
variability is as important as interest rate variability for small open economies for the 
same reason. Below the literature on the effects of inflation targeting on inflation 
variability, output growth variability, exchange rate variability and interest rate 
variability is summarised. The results in the literature serve as a benchmark for the 
results that we find. 
 
1.1 Inflation targeting and volatility of inflation 
Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2000), in their analysis comparing nine inflation 
targeting countries with fourteen industrialised and developing countries, show that 
standard deviation of inflation fell more for the inflation targeting countries than 
other countries analysed. In the sample, comparing late 1980s to the mid 1990s, it 
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can be seen that volatility in both output and inflation fell in all countries, suggesting 
1990s have been relatively shock free. They make a distinction between the types of 
shocks and define two kinds of shocks to the economy; demand and supply shocks. 
They argue that demand shock moves output and inflation in the same direction, 
whereas supply shock moves in reverse directions. Aggregate supply movements 
create a dilemma for the policy makers. Defining these shocks, they form a simple 
model, estimate the responses of inflation and output to increases in interest rates and 
calculate the inflation aversion of the countries. The estimated five-year moving 
coefficient shows that there is a striking difference among targeters and non-
targeters. For seven of nine inflation targeting countries, the estimate of the aversion 
of inflation variability rises substantially either prior to or immediately following the 
regime shift. The fact that the increase in the average level of inflation aversion in 
inflation targeting countries is much higher than non-targeting countries analysed 
reveal that the increase in inflation aversion can be ascribed to the targeting regime 
itself. 
Mishkin and Hebbel (2002) conclude in their cross-country panel analysis 
that inflation targeting countries reduce their long-run inflation below the levels they 
would have attained in the absence of inflation targeting. They also argue that 
inflation targeting has been tested favourably by adverse shocks. 1997 Asian crisis 
had adverse effects on financial markets and on terms of trade in Australia, Chile, 
Israel and New Zealand and led to major exchange rate devaluation in these 
countries. These countries were successful not to let pass through from devaluation 
to inflation. Similarly, Mishkin (1999) argues that shortly after adopting inflation 
targeting, Canada faced a negative supply shock because of the increase in value 
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added tax. This supply shock led only a one-time increase in the price level and was 
not passed through to a persistent rise in the inflation level. Another example is the 
experience of United Kingdom and Sweden. These countries quitted ERM exchange 
rate pegs in 1992 and faced devaluations. Mishkin (1999) argues that devaluation 
would normally have stimulated inflation because of the direct effects on higher 
export and import prices and subsequent effects on price-setting behaviour. Inflation 
targeting in these countries prevented second and later-round effects of devaluation 
and there were not inflationary responses. 
Early studies by Ammer and Freeman (1995) present vector autoregression 
models for real GDP, price levels and interest rates for comparing inflation forecasts 
generated by their vector autoregression models with actual results in New Zealand, 
Canada and United Kingdom. They find that inflation fell by more than predicted 
under inflation targeting. Mishkin and Posen (1997) similarly compare their vector 
autoregression model estimations of inflation, output growth and short-term central 
bank rates with the actual results in New Zealand, Canada and United Kingdom. 
They find that inflation remained below their estimations in these countries. In 
particular, actual inflation did not rise with the upswing in business cycle, as it would 
have been without inflation targeting. Debelle (1997) notes the decline in inflation 
rates after the introduction of inflation targeting in Australia, Canada, Finland, Spain, 
Sweden and United Kingdom. He also points to the fact that other countries also 
achieved reductions in inflation rates. Siklos (1999) analyses the first order auto-
correlation of inflation in inflation targeting countries and argues that the persistence 
of inflation has declined in Australia, Canada and Sweden and lost statistical 
significance in Finland, Spain and United Kingdom after the introduction of inflation 
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targeting. Corbo et al. (2001) show that inflation aversion increased most notably in 
Israel and Chile after inflation targeting is employed. They also note that inflation 
persistence has declined substantially among inflation targeters. The decline in the 
persistence level of inflation suggested by Siklos (1999) and Corbo et al. (2001) can 
be an explanation of how inflation targeting countries prevented second and later-
round effects of devaluation in Asian crisis and ERM crisis and there were not 
inflationary responses. 
Neumann and Von Hagen (2002) compare Australia, Canada, Chile, New 
Zealand, Sweden and United Kingdom with a group of non-inflation targeting 
countries consisting of Germany, Switzerland and United States and search for 
volatility changes in interest rates, inflation and output gaps. It results that average 
inflation in inflation targeting countries has come down to the level of observed for 
non-inflation targeting countries. Similar to average inflation, the volatility of 
inflation has fallen in both groups and the volatility of inflation in inflation targeting 
countries converged from high levels to the levels observed in non-inflation 
targeters. Analysis with monthly Taylor rules show that there is a substantial increase 
in the long-run response to inflation in inflation targeting countries and central banks 
of inflation targeting countries converged to the behaviour of Bundesbank and Swiss 
National Bank, the two banks that showed the strongest determination to keep 
inflation down in the 1970s and 1980s. Neumann and Von Hagen (2002) also 
compare the results of 1978 and 1998 oil price shocks and find that inflation 
targeting countries managed to cope with 1998 oil price shock better than the control 
group, which was not the case with 1978 oil price shock. 
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1.2 Inflation targeting and output stability 
The analysis of the relationship between output and inflation dates back to 
1958, the original Phillips curve in which the benefits of lower inflation have to be 
balanced by the costs in terms of higher unemployment. Phelps (1967) and Friedman 
(1968) predicted that the Phillips curve would shift as expectations of inflation 
adjusted to actual inflation so unemployment could not be kept below its natural rate 
by producing inflation. This destroyed the theoretical basis for assuming a long-run 
trade-off between inflation and unemployment. With the addition of rational 
expectations, Lucas (1973) destroyed even the short-run Phillips curve trade-off. 
Fischer (1995) argues that there is econometric evidence that predictable monetary 
policy affects output, not only the prices and Fischer adds that short-run Phillips 
curve is flatter in a low inflation economy than in a high inflation economy. So in the 
short-run there is always the possibility of increasing output by generating inflation. 
Fischer (1993) shows a consistently negative association between inflation and 
output growth. Analysing the performance of Germany and United States for the 
period 1960-1992, he argues that there remains a trade-off between inflation and 
output stability. 
Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2000) in their analysis comparing nine inflation 
targeting countries with fourteen industrialised and developing countries, conclude 
output variability fell in both of the inflation targeting countries and non-inflation 
targeters. However, output variability fell less for the targeters than for non-targeters. 
They also find evidence that output deviations have a positive weight in all objective 
functions of inflation targeters. 
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Mishkin and Hebbel (2001) argue that inflation targeting has helped in 
reducing sacrifice ratios and output volatility to levels close to those in industrial 
non-inflation targeters. Similarly, Corbo et al. (2000) conclude that sacrifice ratios 
have declined in emerging market countries after adoption of inflation targeting. 
They also find that output volatility has fallen in inflation targeting countries to 
levels observed in industrialised non-inflation targeting countries. Mishkin (1999) 
note that although disinflation is associated with low output growth, once low 
inflation levels are achieved output returns to its previous level. He also points to the 
fact that after the adoption of inflation targeting, strong economic growth levels were 
achieved and this can be attributed to the success of inflation targeting in promoting 
real economic growth in addition to controlling inflation. Mishkin and Posen (1997) 
compare vector autoregression estimations with actual data and find that output did 
not fall under inflation targeting regime in New Zealand, Canada and United 
Kingdom. Neumann and Von Hagen (2002) in their analysis on Australia, Canada, 
Chile, New Zealand, Sweden and United Kingdom find that the volatility of output 
gaps for these countries significantly decreased after the adoption of inflation 
targeting.  
In their theoretical work, Svensson and Rudebusch (2002) make a 
comparison of monetary targeting and inflation targeting and find that monetary 
targeting is much more inefficient in the sense of inducing more variable inflation 
and output than inflation targeting. This result holds even when the sample period is 
chosen so that a very well behaved stable money demand equation comes out. So 
counter to conventional wisdom, monetary targeting is inefficient when money 
 15 
demand is stable and controllable. This is a consequence of the fact that money 
growth is a poor indicator of future inflation. 
 
1.3 Inflation targeting and interest rates 
In the early work of inflation targeting countries, Freeman and Willis (1995) 
find that long-term interest rates fell in New Zealand, Canada and United Kingdom 
however rose back a few years later. For these countries Mishkin and Posen (1997) 
estimate that interest rates remained at lower rates after the introduction of inflation 
targeting than otherwise would be. Kahn and Parrish (1998) note that the volatility of 
central bank interest rates has declined after the introduction of inflation targeting. 
Neumann and Von Hagen (2002) in their analysis on Australia, Canada, 
Chile, New Zealand, Sweden and United Kingdom, find that both the level and the 
volatility of interest rates has fallen in inflation targeting countries as well as non-
inflation targeters. Using the method of double differences for the oil price shocks of 
1978 and 1998, they find that inflation targeting countries managed to prevent long-
term bond rates from rising in 1998 better than in 1978 and this points to the fact that 
the introduction of inflation targeting has produced significant gains in credibility. 
For short-term interest rates, the results are more striking. While the average increase 
in short-term interest rates in 1978 oil shock is 9.99 percent in inflation targeting 
countries, it is 2.65 percent in 1998 oil price shock. So, inflation targeting central 
banks managed to reduce their response to the increase in oil prices more than non-
inflation targeting countries. 
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1.4 Inflation targeting and exchange rate volatility 
Exchange rate movements can have a major impact on inflation particularly 
in small open economies. While, depreciation leads to a rise in inflation as a result of 
the pass through from higher import prices and lower export prices, appreciation of 
the domestic currency makes domestic business uncompetitive because of increased 
export prices. Although, exchange rate movements play a vital role in a country’s 
monetary policy, there are only a few theoretical studies and there aren’t any 
empirical studies on the effects of inflation targeting on exchange rate volatility.  
Gali and Monacelli (1999) compare domestic inflation targeting, CPI 
targeting and exchange rate peg. They define domestic inflation as the rate of change 
in the index of domestic goods prices and CPI as the weighted average of the price of 
domestic goods and the price of foreign goods. Gali and Monacelli show that these 
monetary policy rules can be ranked in terms of their nominal and real exchange rate 
volatility. Domestic inflation targeting can achieve simultaneous stabilisation of the 
output gap and domestic inflation but implies a substantially higher volatility of both 
nominal and real exchange rates than the CPI targeting and exchange rate peg. CPI 
targeting can be seen as a hybrid regime between domestic inflation targeting and 
exchange rate peg because of its equilibrium dynamics. CPI targeting coincides with 
domestic inflation targeting in the case of a closed economy while it coincides with 
exchange rate peg when the economy converges to its maximum level of openness. 
Mishkin and Hebbel (2002) give examples of effects of exchange rate 
targeting in inflation targeting countries. Israel, as part of its inflation targeting 
regime, has an intermediate target of a quite narrow exchange band and Mishkin and 
Hebbel suggest that this slowed Israel’s efforts to win support for disinflation and 
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lowering of the inflation targets. Another example of the negative effects of targeting 
on exchange rate is the experience with New Zealand. New Zealand was targeting on 
a Monetary Conditions Index, a weighted average of exchange rate and short-term 
interest rates, at the time of the Asian crisis. Limiting exchange rate fluctuations have 
led New Zealand to respond in a wrong manner to the Asian crisis starting in 1997. 
After the devaluation of the Thai baht, MCI began a sharp decline causing the central 
bank of New Zealand to increase interest rates more than 200 basis points. This in 
turn led to a recession in 1998. The central bank of New Zealand reversed its course 
and sharply lowered interest rates in July 1998 and abandoned using Monetary 
Conditions Index in 1999. The response of Chile to Asian crisis was similar. Chile 
was using an exchange rate band with a crawling peg at the time of the crisis and not 
letting peso to devaluate caused a mild recession in late 1998. After the recession has 
started, interest rates were lowered and the peso was allowed to decline. Chile 
abolished its exchange rate band in September 1999. In contrast to New Zealand and 
Chile, central bank of Australia lowered its interest rates when faced with the 
devaluation in Thailand in July 1997. This way, Australia kept its output growth 
strong throughout the crisis and inflation remained under control. The writers 
conclude that targeting on an exchange rate within the inflation targeting regime is 
likely to worsen the performance of inflation targeting countries. Countries that only 
target inflation have a better performance when faced with shocks. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Inflation Targeting As A Monetary Policy  
 
It is argued that inflation targeting should be implemented through a “Taylor 
rule” in which interest rates are adjusted in response to output, inflation and lagged 
interest rate.  
We can define a Taylor rule as follows: 
(1.1) 1 1 1 2* + ( ) + 
av av
t t t tr r y
∗
− −= π +µ π − π µ % . 
tr  is the quarter t value of an interest rate instrument, 
*r  is the steady state value of 
interest rate implied by the policy rule, 1
av
t−π  is the average inflation rate over the four 
periods prior to t, *π  is the target inflation rate and t t ty y y= −%  is the difference 
between the logs of real GDP and its natural rate value.  The policy feedback 
parameters 1µ  and 2µ  are positive and each of them equals 0.5 in Taylor’s (1993: 
195-214) example. The interest rate is raised in response to inflation and output gaps 
relative to their targets.  
Taylor rules that involve a lagged interest rate are: 
(1.2)         1 1 2 + ( *) + t t t tr r yρ −= µ π − π µ % , 
tr , the nominal interest rate used as the instrument, responds to inflation rate at 
period t, the difference between the logs of real GDP and its natural rate value and 
lagged interest rate. This allows for interest rate smoothing.  
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Taylor rules that only respond to lagged values: 
(1.3)   1 1 1 2 1 + ( *) + t t t tr r yρ − − −= µ π − π µ % . 
With this modification, the central bank operations are more transparent since the 
policy only responds to previous period’s values that are publicly known.  
Forward-looking Taylor rules: 
(1.4) *1 )t t t t t jr r rρ ρ µ Ε ∗− += + (1− ) + ( π − π , 
where, *tr denotes the equilibrium value of real interest rates and 
∗π  is the inflation 
target. The policy choice variables are j, ρ and µ. ρ dictates the degree of interest rate 
smoothing, j is the target horizon and µ is the policy feedback parameter. 
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) make a distinction between instrument rules 
and targeting rules. They define an explicit instrument rule (e.g. Taylor rules defined 
above) as a rule that expresses the monetary policy instrument as an explicit function 
of available information. They also claim that no central bank follows an explicit 
instrument rule and these rules can only serve as a baseline for comparison of the 
policies actually followed. Targeting rules are represented by the assignment of a 
loss function over deviations of a goal variable from a target level. This way, a 
targeting rule is an implicit instrument rule and the first order conditions of the 
optimization problem will yield the explicit instrument rule. Inflation targeting 
means having a loss function for monetary policy where deviations of inflation from 
target are always given positive weight but not necessarily all the weight. The loss 
function to be minimized is 1[ ] var( ) var( ) var( )t t t t tE L y r rπ µ ρ −= + + −% , tπ  is the 
average four period deviation of inflation from the target, ty%  is the percentage gap 
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between actual real output and potential output and tr  is the deviation from the 
average nominal interest rate.  
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), define flexible inflation-forecast targeting 
rule as: 
(1.5) 1( )t T t t t tr cπ π+ +=| |  
where c and T fulfil 0 1 and 2c T≤ ≤ ≥ . t T tπ + |  is the average of the forecast of four 
period inflation T periods ahead conditional on the current state of variables and the 
corresponding reaction function (e.g. a Taylor rule). ( )t T t trπ + |  is the forecast of an 
average of four period inflation T periods ahead conditional on a given constant 
current and future interest rate. This rule is a first-order condition for the 
minimization of a loss function with nonnegative weight on output stabilization but 
zero weight on interest rate smoothing and the corresponding explicit interest rate 
rule is solved for. 
Similarly, a strict inflation-forecast targeting rule is a solution to  
(1.6) ( ) 0t T t trπ + =|  
These rules can be considered under smoothing of the interest rate where the 
corresponding implicit instrument rules depend on the lagged interest rate as well as 
the solutions to the equations (1.5) and (1.6). They are denoted as flexible/strict 
inflation forecast targeting rules with smoothing. Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) 
compare Taylor rules, flexible inflation forecast targeting rules and strict inflation 
forecast targeting rules with the optimal rule they find. They first set ρ=0.5 in the 
loss function above and compute the variances of inflation, output and interest rate 
together with the losses with µ=1, 0.2 and 5. Then with µ=1, they change ρ to 0.1 
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and 1. They find that simple forward-looking Taylor rules of type (1.4) are extremely 
close to matching the optimal rules. Inflation forecast targeting rules without interest 
rate smoothing perform very poorly overall. Although the performance regarding 
inflation and output variability are not bad within these rules, interest rate variability 
is very high. Strict inflation forecast targeting rules with smoothing perform poorly 
in terms of total loss as µ increases but flexible inflation forecast targeting rules with 
smoothing perform close to the optimal rule when especially µ=1, and µ=0.2. Strict 
inflation forecast targeting rules with smoothing and with a short forecast horizon, 
consistently achieve the minimum variability of inflation among all the rules 
analysed, with a huge sacrifice in output and interest rate variability. As the forecast 
horizon increases, inflation variability increases and output and interest rate volatility 
decrease. As µ increases, variance of output decreases and variance of inflation 
increases in all of the rules. With flexible inflation forecast targeting rules with 
smoothing, variances of interest rates increase with increasing µ. Keeping in mind 
that ρ is constant when µ varies, this shows that within flexible inflation targeting 
rules with smoothing, there is a tradeoff between inflation-interest rate variability 
and output variability. Varying ρ when µ is 1 shows us that, as ρ increases both 
inflation and output variability increase under flexible inflation forecast targeting 
with smoothing. Strict inflation targeting with smoothing performs better as ρ 
increases and forecast horizon is enlarged. Flexible inflation forecast targeting rules 
with smoothing are again close to the optimal rule. The responses of inflation 
targeting rules to positive inflation or output shocks reveal that inflation targeting 
rules without interest rate smoothing show large initial interest rate spikes in 
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response to positive inflation or output shocks. The mildest response belongs to the 
flexible inflation forecast targeting rule with interest rate smoothing. 
Callum and Nelson (1999) using a Taylor rule of type (1.2) try to investigate 
the optimality of different monetary policies. They solve a household optimization 
problem assuming sticky prices. The parameters on inflation and output gap 
variability in the resulting loss function depend on the optimization itself; they are 
not choice parameters of the monetary policy. They consider cases with ρ=1 to 
reflect interest rate smoothing. Simulation results on U.S. data show that for a given 
value of the smoothing parameter ρ, higher values of 1µ  or 2µ , lead invariably to 
lower standard deviations of that variable. They claim that this suggests that if there 
were no concern for the variability of the interest rate, the central bank could 
perfectly achieve good macroeconomic performance by responding to deviations of 
output and inflation from their target values. With a lagged Taylor rule like (1.3) 
simulation results indicate a trade-off between inflation and output gap variability. 
Rules with interest rate smoothing perform better with respect to inflation and output 
gap variability as well as interest rate variability itself.  
A similar analysis is by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). They provide a 
framework for analyzing different types of Taylor rules using a rational expectations 
model derived from intertemporal optimization. Comparing rules of type (1.1), (1.2), 
(1.3) with different weights given to inflation and output stabilization and interest 
rate smoothing, they find that rules that have smaller standard deviations of inflation 
tend to involve larger standard deviations of output and vice versa. Rules without 
interest rate smoothing are dominated because they induce a higher standard 
deviation of inflation without reducing the standard deviation of output. They also 
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find that standard deviations of interest rate and inflation move together so that a 
policy that comparatively induces a lower standard deviation of interest rate also has 
a lower standard deviation of inflation. Standard deviations of inflation and long-run 
price level also move together.  
Ball (1999) searches for optimal rules for open economies. He shows the 
inflation-output variability tradeoff and how exchange rate can affect this tradeoff. 
He also finds that strict inflation targeting induces large fluctuations in exchange rate 
but this could be remedied by targeting to long-run inflation. 
Ball (1999) develops a model for open economies that includes exchange 
rate. The model is: 
(2.1) 1 1 1t t ty r e y− − −= −β −δ + λ + ε  
(2.2) 1 1 1 2t t t ty e eπ π − − − −= + α − γ( − ) + η  
(2.3) e r= θ + ν  
where y is the log of real output, r is the real interest rate, e is the log of real 
exchange rate, π is inflation and ε,η and ν are white noise shocks. All variables are 
measured as deviations from average levels. 
The first equation is an open economy IS curve. The second equation is an 
open economy Phillips curve. The change in inflation depends on the lag of output, 
the lagged change in exchange rate and a shock. The change in exchange rate affects 
inflation because it is passed directly into import prices. The third equation links 
exchange rate to interest rate. The central bank chooses the real interest rate r. the 
policy affects inflation through two channels. The first channel is through Phillips 
curve that takes two periods, a monetary contraction raises r and e 
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contemporaneously but it takes a period for these variables to affect output and 
another period for output to affect inflation. However, it takes one period for an 
exchange rate change to affect inflation. 
Ball uses parameters obtained from medium to small open economies 
including Canada, Australia and New Zealand. He assumes that λ=0.8, α=0.4 and 
β+δθ=1 where λ corresponds to output persistence, α to the slope of the Phillips 
curve and β+δθ to the total output loss from a 1-point rise in the interest rate. The 
other parameters depend on the economy’s degree of openness and based on he 
assumes γ=0.2, θ=2.0 and β/δ=3.0. He eliminates r from the model by substitution. 
(2.4) 1 1( ) ( )y e yβ/θ δ λ ε β/θ ν+ += − + + + +  
(2.5) 1 1 1( )y e eπ = π α γ η+ − ++ − − +  
Optimal rule is: 
(2.6) 1(1 ) ( )wr w e ay b eπ γ −+ − = + +  
where w and b, a are constants that depend on m, n, β, α, θ, and λ. 
This expresses the optimal rule as an average of r and e with constants m and 
n to be determined. So, optimal policy uses monetary conditions index (MCI) as the 
instrument, a combination of inflation and lagged exchange rate. In equation (2.6) the 
rationale for using a monetary conditions index is that it measures the stance of the 
policy, policymakers shift the MCI when they want to ease or tighten. Also in 
equation 2.6, inflation π is replaced with a combination of inflation and exchange 
rate, c. This can be interpreted as the long-run inflation forecast of inflation under the 
assumption that output is at its natural level. While in a closed economy this forecast 
would equal the current inflation, in an open economy inflation will change in order 
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exchange rate to return to its long-run level that is normalized to zero. For example, 
if e was positive in the previous period, there will be depreciation in e starting at 
some point in the current period and this will in turn raise current inflation by 1eγ − . 
This adjustment from inflation to 1eγ −  is similar to the calculations of core inflation 
in central banks that filter out the transitory effects of temporary influences. Ball 
claims that Canada, New Zealand and Sweden follow the approach of monetary 
conditions index. 
The policymaker’s objective is to minimize var( ) var(y µ+ π) . Ball computes 
the m and n that make the policy efficient for different values of µ; the variances of 
output and inflation form the output-inflation variability frontier. The set of efficient 
m and n depends on the coefficients in the equations (2.1) (2.2) and (2.3) but not on 
the shocks. In the resulting frontier, as µ increases var(π) decreases and var(y) 
increases. As µ →∞  var( ) 0π →  and var( )y →∞  and as 0µ → , var( )π →∞  
and var( ) 0y → . However, using an inefficient rule causes the variances of output 
and inflation to be affected from the variances of the shocks. In his setting, using r as 
the policy instrument is most inefficient if there are large shocks to the r/e relation 
and the corresponding variances of output and inflation are infinite. 
Ball defines strict inflation targeting as a policy that minimizes the variance 
of inflation and that does not put any weight on output variance in the loss function. 
So the policymaker minimizes var(π). When inflation deviates from its target, strict 
targeting eliminates the deviation as quickly as possible. Policy can affect inflation in 
one period through exchange rate channel. Hence, strict inflation targeting implies 
that next period’s inflation is set to zero. 
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(2.7) 1 0Eπ+ = . 
The efficient policy now implies a huge sacrifice in output stability for a small gaij in 
inflation variability.  Equation (2.7) also implies large fluctuations in exchange rate 
because next period’s inflation can only be controlled by this period’s exchange rate. 
Large shifts in import prices are needed to move the average price level. Large 
fluctuations in exchange rate in turn imply output fluctuations through (2.1). 
Therefore, after a unit shock to (2.2), inflation returns to its target after one period 
but the shock triggers oscillations in exchange rate and output. Oscillations arise 
because the exchange rate must be used to offset the previous period’s inflationary or 
deflationary effects of the first shock. This drawback of strict inflation targeting can 
be eliminated through long-run inflation targets.  
Strict long-run inflation targeting is defined as the policy that minimizes 
*
1eπ π γ −= + . Now equation (2.2) can be rewritten as 
(2.8) * *1 1yπ π α η− −= + + . 
This equation is the same as the closed economy Phillips curve. Policy affects 
inflation only through the output channel. The exchange rate channel is eliminated 
and the policy affects *π with a two period lag and strict targeting implies  
(2.9) *2 0Eπ+ = . 
Targeting *π  produces more stable output than targeting π because it eliminates the 
oscillations of output and exchange rate caused by using exchange rate to control 
inflation. Ball also considers gradual adjustment of *π  where 
(2.10) * *2 1  ,  0 1E qE qπ π+ += ≤ ≤ . 
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The motivation for adjusting slowly is to smooth the path of output. Strict 
long-run inflation targeting, with or without a gradual adjustment mechanism, 
produces smaller variances of output than strict short-run inflation targeting. 
However, for a given inflation variance, output variance can be made smaller by 
putting a nonnegligable weight on output in the optimization problem. Flexible-
inflation targeting produces less output and inflation variance compared to strict 
long-run inflation targeting, this means that the output-inflation variance frontier 
defined by flexible inflation targeting dominates the output-inflation variance frontier 
defined by strict long-run inflation targeting. As q is increased, strict long-run 
inflation targeting with gradual adjustment more closely matches the efficient 
frontier defined by flexible inflation targeting. For example, for equal weights on 
inflation and output variances so that 1µ = , optimal flexible inflation targeting 
produces variances of output and inflation that are 2.50 and 2.44 and with strict long-
run inflation targeting the optimal policy produces output and inflation variances that 
are equal to 2.48 both when q=0.66.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Data and Methodology 
 
In the lights of above arguments I try to find out whether after the adoption of 
inflation targeting the volatilities in CPI inflation, exchange rate, interest rate, money 
growth and production growth have changed. I analyze nine countries that adopted 
inflation targeting: Australia, Canada, Chile, Finland, Israel, New Zealand, Spain, 
Sweden and United Kingdom (U.K.). Among these countries, I compare Canada with 
United States (U.S.), Finland with Norway, Sweden with Denmark and U.K. with 
France. The historical relations, geographical proximity and being important import and 
export partners are the main reasons for choosing the comparison countries. 
 
3.1 Data 
The shift dates to inflation targeting are taken as in Mishkin and Hebbel (2001). 
The dates are defined by the first month of the first period for which inflation targets are 
announced previously. The shift dates are reported in the structural break results tables 
in the appendix. All data are taken from IMF International Finance Statistics (IFS) 
unless otherwise stated. Data starts from January 1980 except Israel. Israel interest rate 
data starts at June 1984 and the period between June 1984 and January 1986 is not 
 29 
included in the analysis because of the hyperinflationary period and as a consequence 
very high interest rates. Data ends for most of the countries in the second half of 2001. 
Important exceptions are; CPI inflation data for Australia ends at June 1997, data for 
interest rates in New Zealand ends at October 1999, data for money base in Spain ends 
at December 1998 with the introduction of the European System of Central Banks, 
industrial production data for Sweden ends at January 2000. When analyzing, all except 
interest rates are calculated as the twelve-month log differences. If there is no monthly 
data on consumer prices, then relevant price indexes are used to measure inflation. If 
available, money base is taken when calculating money growth rate, otherwise broad 
money is used, however it must be noted that there are differences in the definitions of 
broad money among countries. All exchange rates are national currency versus U.S. 
dollars.  
For Australia, interest rate is 13 week’s Treasury bill rate. There is no monthly 
data for consumer prices, so manufacturing output prices available until June 1996 is 
used. For Canada interest rate is Treasury bill rate and the data for monetary base that is 
seasonally adjusted is taken from Datastream. For Chile, interest rate is the deposit rate 
and production data is manufacturing production. The data for monetary base that is 
seasonally adjusted is taken from Datastream. For Finland interest rate is the average 
cost of central bank debt rate. Money is calculated by adding currency in circulation and 
demand deposits and there is an implausible break with the introduction of Euro in 1999 
that is due to changed definitions of data on IFS. There is data for monetary base in 
Datastream that does not have this problem but starts from 1987. For Israel, the data for 
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money is seasonally adjusted, interest rate is the Treasury bill rate and inflation is 
measured using the prices of industrial products. For New Zealand, the data for 
exchange rate and 3-month Treasury bill rate are taken from IFS, data on M1 that is not 
seasonally adjusted is taken from Datastream. There is no monthly data for consumer 
prices and industrial production. For Spain, money supply is M1 and interest rate is the 
call money rate. For Sweden, the data for money is money plus quasi-money that is 
seasonally adjusted and interest rate is 3-months treasury discount notes. For U.K., 
seasonally adjusted money base and Treasury bill rate are used. The data is summarized 
in Table 14. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
First we made ARCH estimation both for full sample data and for the full sample 
divided into two at date of adoption of inflation targeting. The results are not reported 
for two reasons. First, the resulting ARCH processes are so complicated that there does 
not exist any tool to test for breaks and second, even if there was a tool to test for breaks 
then the results would be biased because ARCH estimation is based on the assumption 
that the sample is uniform. Making an estimation based on the uniformity assumption 
and then testing the results of the estimation for differences in the sample would bias the 
results. 
To do structural break tests on the samples, we calculated the twelve-month 
moving average standard deviations of the data and used Bai and Perron (2003) 
structural break tests to test for breaks in the data. The results of the structural break tests 
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for standard deviations of the variables are reported in tables in the appendix along with 
the break dates. All country tables include the test results of the standard deviations of 
CPI inflation, exchange rate, interest rate, money growth and industrial production 
growth rate. Since the recommended maximum number of breaks allowed in the test is 
five breaks, the tables display a maximum of six entries. The coefficients and the 
standard errors of the coefficients are displayed, the latter in brackets. For sudden breaks 
the logic behind the coefficients is as follows: the first coefficient is an approximation of 
the level of the variable tested from the start of the data up to the date when the first 
structural break occurs if there exists one. In our setup the level of the variable is the 
level of the standard deviation of CPI inflation, exchange rate and so on. Similarly, the 
second coefficient is the approximation of the level of the standard deviation between 
the first break and the second break. For gradual breaks it is assumed that there is an 
underlying persistence level of the variable and the first coefficient is that persistence in 
the data. The second coefficient is then the additional change of the variable from the 
start of the data until the first break, taking the first coefficient as the basis level.  
The structural break dates suggested by the test that are listed in the tables are 
interpreted together with the moving average and standard deviation figures. In the 
tables, first we check whether there is a break around the date of shift to inflation 
targeting. If there is a break, then it is important whether the subsequent coefficients 
suggested by the test are smaller or larger than the previous period. It is important to 
keep in mind that the test results might not be solely meaningful and that even the small 
changes sometimes appear as structural breaks. So, in the analysis greater emphasis is 
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put on the general trend rather than the dates and the numbers themselves. We include 
the figures of the twelve-month moving average and standard deviation data for all of 
the variables in the analysis and visually inspect the structural break dates suggested by 
the test with actual data. The moving averages of the variables are used to analyze the 
level changes especially for inflation and production growth. In the country analysis 
starting from section 4.1 with Australia, the first figures included are the moving 
averages of the variables and the second figures are the standard deviation of the 
variables. 
We tested for sudden shifts as well as gradual breaks. As suggested in Bai and 
Perron (2003), the leading criteria for assuring a break is an at least 2.5 percent level 
confidence for the existence of breaks in the structural break test results. Then the 
coefficients between break dates are taken from the information criterion, BIC. If the 
resulting 90 percent confidence intervals for break dates of BIC are sufficiently narrow 
then the break dates are taken from BIC results, otherwise they are taken from the 
optimization results listed in the structural break test results. Breaks are in the first place 
taken from 10 percent trimming of the data, which means that data is searched for breaks 
in the 10 percent of the original data. If there is data for 240 months, then changes are 
searched in 24 months periods and the search is repeated for every month. If 10 percent 
trimming does not reveal any breaks then 5 percent trimming is done which is denoted 
by an asterix. This lets us to catch sudden and short-lived shocks as well as the longer-
lived changes but induces the possibility of size distortions. This is because, 5 percent of 
the sample may be too small for estimations such as variances. As discussed in Bai and 
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Perron (2000), a trimming as small as 5% of the total sample can lead to tests with 
substantial size distortions when allowing different variances of the errors across 
segments or when serial correlation is permitted. This is because one is then trying to 
estimate various quantities using very few observations 
To make the idea of structural break tests clear and to explain the importance of 
Bai and Perron (2003) test that I use in the thesis, I introduce a brief review of structural 
break tests in the next section. 
The comparisons of the countries are based on the differences of the variables of 
interest between the countries. As an example, the comparison of the standard deviation 
of CPI inflation in Canada with that of in the U.S. is based on the analysis of the 
standard deviation of CPI inflation in Canada minus the standard deviation of CPI 
inflation in the U.S. We also included the ratios of the variables but especially when 
twelve month moving averages of some variables are close to zero, the ratios tend to be 
very high or very low which makes the interpretation of the results difficult. Hence, 
hardly any use of the ratios has been made. The difference and ratio tables are included 
in the appendix. 
 
3.3 Structural Break Tests 
There are a vast number of structural break tests; the earliest is due to Chow 
(1960). The Chow test is for stationary variables and allows for one break with a known 
break point. In the linear regression (3.1) and (3.2) where the errors are assumed to be 
independent and normally distributed and X1 and X2 matrices are assumed to be 
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nonsingular, testing the equality of γ1 = γ2 =γ  where the alternative is γ1 ≠ γ2 implies 
testing for a structural break with a known break point.. 
(3.1)    y1 =  X1 β1 + ε1 =  Z1γ1 + W1δ1 + ε1 
(3.2)    y2 =  X2 β2 + ε2 =  Z2γ2 + W2δ2 + ε2 
Quandt (1960) discusses testing the null hypothesis of constant coefficients 
against a structural change at an unknown point in time. Kim and Siegmund (1989) 
examined likelihood ratio tests to test for a structural change in a simple linear 
regression against two alternatives; the alternative of the intercept change and the 
alternative of intercept and slope change.  
Brown, Durbin and Evans (1975) suggest the CUSUM test that is aimed at 
detecting systematic movements of coefficients. They also proposed CUSUM of squares 
test to search for whether the change is random or systematic. In the regression (3.3) the 
errors are assumed to be independent and normally distributed with mean zero and 
variances σ2t. the hypothesis of constancy over time is βt = β  ∀t. 
(3.3)    yt =  Xt βt + εt    where t = 1,2,…,T denotes time. 
Define the recursive residual wr where r = k+1,…T as  
(3.4)    ( yr – xrbr-1 ) / √ ( 1 + xr′ (Xr-1′ Xr-1)-1xr)′ 
where br is the least squares estimate of β based on the first r observations and Xr is the 
stacked x matrices up to time r. Now, the sum of squares of wr’s divided by the 
estimated standard deviation is the CUSUM quantity with an expected value of zero 
under the null hypothesis.  
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Extensions of the CUSUM test have been made by Ploberger et.al. (1989). 
Deriving the appropriate asymptotic distribution of the test statistic is the main problem 
in these tests and Andrews (1993) derives the asymptotic distribution of the Quandt, 
Wald and Lagrange Multiplier tests for one structural change with an unknown change 
point. Andrews’ test applies to nonlinear models with no deterministic trends whereas 
CUSUM test applies only to linear models. Andrews and Ploberger (1994) develop tests 
with stronger optimality properties than Andrews’ test. Andrews et al. (1996) present a 
Monte Carlo simulation comparing these tests.  
The case of multiple unknown breaks has been discussed by Kim and Maddala 
(1991). A commonly used method to test for multiple breaks is the Markov switching 
regression model. With multiple structural break tests, there is the problem of estimation 
the number of breaks. This is a model selection problem noted as in Kim and Maddala 
(1991). Bai and Perron (1995) also analyzed this problem. 
Kim and Maddala (2000) list the most important points to consider in tests for 
structural change. The first is determining the number and location of break points, 
second there is a problem of consistent estimation of the break point that is dealt in Bai 
and Perron (1995). Third, since the switch from one regime to the other is rarely sudden, 
gradual structural change must be considered. 
 Bai and Perron (2003) address the problem of the estimation of break dates.  The 
multiple structural break model with m breaks is: 
     yt =  Xt β + Ztδ1 + εt    t = 1,2,…,T1  
(3.5)     yt =  Xt β + Ztδ2 + εt    t = T1+1,…, T2 
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    ………………………. 
yt =  Xt β + Ztδm+1 + εt   t = Tm+1+1,…, T 
The break points T1, T2,…,Tm+1 are treated as unknown and are estimated 
together with the coefficients β and δj. In the presence of β, this is a partial structural 
change model whereas if β = 0 the model becomes a pure structural change model where 
all the parameters are subject to change.  
First, they present an efficient algorithm to obtain global minimizers of the sum 
of squared residuals by using dynamic optimization. β and δj’s are estimated by least 
squares given the m partition (T1, T2,…,Tm). Substituting the estimates of β and δj’s into 
the minimization of sum of squared residuals and denoting the resulting sum of squared 
residuals as ST(T1, , Tm), the estimated break points ( 1, , m) are such that ( 1, 
, m) = argminT1, , Tm ST(T1, , Tm), where the minimization is taken over all 
partitions (T1, , Tm) such that Ti - Ti-1 q and q is the dimension of the Z matrix. The 
break points are the global minimizers of the objective function and can be estimated by 
searching possible number of segments in the data when m is given. 
Second, they consider the problem of forming confidence intervals for break 
dates by allowing the data and errors to have different distributions across segments or 
imposing a common structure and the problem of estimating the number of breaks. The 
limiting distribution of the break dates is shown under some regulatory conditions. 
Third, Bai and Perron (2003) construct tests for the existence of breaks and they 
also discuss methods based on information criteria and a method based on a sequential 
testing procedure for the estimation of the number of breaks. One important aspect of the 
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Bai and Perron (2003, 1995) structural break tests is that the tests can be constructed 
allowing different serial correlation in the errors, different distribution for the data and 
the errors across segments or imposing a common structure.  
Following Andrews (1993), they consider the supF type test of no structural 
break m = 0 versus m = k known breaks. To test the existence of an unknown number of 
breaks, Bai and Perron (1995) have introduced two tests of the null hypothesis of no 
structural break against an unknown number of breaks given some upper bound M. 
These are called the double maximum tests. Double maximum tests are used in Bai and 
Perron (2003). The first double maximum test is an equal weighted version of the F test 
defined by:  
(3.6) UDmaxFT(M,q) = max FT (λ1,λ2,…,λm;q)  
where 1 ≤ m ≤ M and λj=Tj/T (j = 1, , m) are the estimates of the break points 
obtained using the global minimization of the sum of squared residuals. The second test, 
WD max FT(M, q) applies weights to the individual tests such by equating the marginal 
p-values across values of m. common procedure to select the dimension of a model is to 
consider an information criterion. In addition to supF and double maximum tests, they 
use a sup Wald type test for the null hypothesis of no change versus an alternative 
containing an arbitrary number of changes and they use this procedure to test the null 
hypothesis of l changes, versus the alternative hypothesis of l + 1 changes. 
For estimating the number of breaks, Bai and Perron (2003) use both the 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and modified Schwarz criterion (LWZ) which is 
proposed by Liu et al. (1997). Bai and Perron (2003) claim that the BIC and LWZ 
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perform reasonably well in the absence of serial correlation in the errors but chooses a 
much higher value than the true one in the presence of serial correlation. The method 
suggested by Bai and Perron (2003, 1995) is the sequential application of the supFT(l + 
1|l). 
 To conclude, Bai and Perron (2003) structural break test proposes solutions to 
the three most important problems that are listed in Kim and Maddala (2000). These are, 
determining the number and location of break points, the problem of consistent 
estimation of the break point and the issue of gradual structural change. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Analysis 
 
4.1 Australia 
Structural break test results are listed in Table 1. There are structural breaks for 
CPI inflation, exchange rate and interest rate. There is no monthly data on industrial 
production so the test could not be performed. For money growth rate, there are not any 
structural changes. Since Australia shifts to inflation targeting in September 1994, the 
results on CPI inflation, exchange rate and interest rate are meaningful.  
There was a structural change around the shift date for inflation. It can be viewed 
that the volatility of CPI inflation rapidly falls from June 1989 to February 1994. After 
February 1994, there is a slight increase in the standard deviation of inflation. As seen in 
Figure 1.a.1, these are the episodes of rapid disinflation. After disinflation is completed, 
inflation is relaxed to swing at the 2%-3% percent band as intended in inflation 
targeting.  
For exchange rate, there is a fall in standard deviation between April 1989 and 
April 1994 compared to the preceding 5 years. This matches with the disinflation period 
of Australia. It can be argued that relatively lower volatility of exchange rate made the 
disinflation period more successful and rapid since the central bank was not 
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targeting on exchange rate at the period of disinflation. An increase in standard 
deviation follows this, which is followed by a decrease after two years.  
The changes in interest rates are the most dramatic findings for Australia. 
From March 1987 to November 2000 where data ends, there is a rapid decrease in 
interest rate volatility. This also follows the lines of disinflation period; a remarkable 
drop in the volatility of interest rates comes along with disinflation. However it can 
be seen from Figure 1.c.1 that the drop starts two years after disinflation has started 
which states that not until disinflation was credible that interest rates started to fall. 
After the adoption of inflation targeting this trend does not change and volatility does 
not increase.  
To sum up, within the two years before the adoption of inflation targeting, 
there are increases in inflation volatility and exchange rate volatility. After the 
adoption of inflation targeting, there is no change in inflation volatility, a decrease in 
exchange rate volatility and a decrease in interest rate volatility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.a.1 CPI inflation Figure 1.a.2 CPI inflation std. dev. 
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Figure 1.b.1 Exchange rate   Figure 1.b.2 Exchange rate std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.c.1 Interest rate   Figure 1.c.2 Interest rate std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.d.1 Money growth   Figure 1.d.2 Money growth std. dev. 
 
4.2 Canada 
Structural break test results are summarised in Table 2 and Canada shifts to 
inflation targeting at February 1991. The results suggest that there are sudden shifts 
in CPI inflation, interest rate, money growth rate and industrial production growth 
rate.  
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CPI inflation volatility results reveal that after a period of low volatility 
between 1983 and 1990, there is a gradual and significant increase in volatility until 
the end of 1991. Since then, there are no structural breaks which suggest that one 
year after the adoption of inflation targeting there has not been any significant 
structural changes in the volatility of inflation and inflation volatility remained low 
throughout the 1990s. This in turn suggests that shifting from monetary targeting to 
inflation targeting by 1991 was successful in terms of decreasing inflation volatility. 
The increase in inflation volatility between 1990 and 1992 is most likely due to the 
slight increase in inflation level and the consequent disinflation efforts.  
The test does suggest no break for exchange rate, however it is visible from 
Figure 2.b.1 that there is a gradual decline in volatility from the start of 1980s to 
1987 and it seems that until then there has not been any significant change in 
exchange rate volatility. This might be due to the fact that, before adopting inflation 
targeting Canada was targeting multiple monetary aggregates containing exchange 
rate, after the adoption of inflation targeting Canada targeted on monetary conditions 
index that includes a weighted index of exchange rate and inflation. This must have 
induced the continuous trend in exchange rate volatility.  
After starting 1980s with a high level, volatility of interest rates gradually 
decline until 1990. Between January 1990 and November 1992, for about three years, 
there is a spike in interest rate volatility. This corresponds to the times inflation 
targeting is introduced. By the start of 1993, the volatility falls and by mid-1996 it 
reaches its minimum of the last twenty years.  
With money supply, there is a trend similar to interest rate volatility except 
the money supply shock of 1998. A decline in money supply volatility starts by the 
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start of 1987 and volatility of money reduces as low to 0.7 % by mid 1995. With a 
shock in 1998, money supply volatility jumps. This probably is the consequence of 
exchange rate appreciation against U.S. dollar, the appreciation causes real money 
demand to increase thus central bank increases money supply not to let Canadian 
dollars to appreciate more. Careful examination of exchange rate and money supply 
figures, Figure 2.b.1 and Figure 2.d.1 reveal that they are counter cyclical.  
There are three structural breaks for industrial production, all of which are in 
1980s. There is a gradual decline in industrial production growth volatility and after 
June 1988, production growth is stabilised with a volatility of 1.5 %. This tells us 
that inflation targeting did not cause production growth volatility to increase. 
Checking the actual growth rates tell us that inflation targeting does not cause 
production growth to decrease either. After 1992, production growth stays within the 
band 2-7 percent.  
So, in Canada, within the two years before the introduction of inflation 
targeting, there are increases in inflation volatility and interest rate volatility, there 
are no changes for other monetary aggregates. After the new regime is employed, 
inflation volatility, interest rate volatility and money growth volatility decreases; 
money growth volatility increases after 1998 and production growth volatility does 
not change with the new regime. 
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Figure 2.a.1 CPI inflation   Figure 2.a.2 CPI inflation std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.b.1 Exchange rate   Figure 2.b.2 Exchange rate std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.c.1 Interest rate   Figure 2.c.2 Interest rate std. dev. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.d.1 Money growth   Figure 2.d.2 Money growth std. dev. 
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Figure 2.e.1 Production growth  Figure 2.e.2 Prod. growth std.dev. 
 
4.3 United States 
Structural break test results summarised in Table 3 suggest that there are 
sudden shifts in CPI inflation, exchange rate, money growth rate and industrial 
production growth rate. Comparison of the difference between the variables of 
Canada with the U.S. is summarised in Figures 14.a-14.e, the ratios of the variables 
are in the Figures 15.a-15.e. All comparison figures are in the appendix. 
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volatility of inflation in Canada is higher than in the U.S. After 1995 the difference is 
less than 0.2 percent. 
There are breaks for exchange rate, which is the U.S. dollar versus SDR. 
Exchange rate volatility is stable between 1985 and 1995 with an increasing trend in 
the mean exchange rate. We can also see two structural breaks afterwards however 
the volatility change is very small and it is not clear from Figure 3.b.1 and Figure 
3.b.2 that these are structural changes. When we compare Canada with the U.S., it is 
hard to conclude whether there is a change in the difference of exchange rate 
volatilities between Canada and the U.S. after Canada introduced inflation targeting. 
The difference between the exchange rate standard deviations is fluctuating before 
and after the regime change in Canada. 
There are no structural breaks for interest rates in the U.S. We can see from 
Figure 3.c.1 that average interest rate is gradually decreasing since the start of 1980s. 
In contrast to the U.S. there are structural changes for interest rates in Canada. 
However we can see that the gradual declines in the average interest rates are very 
similar to each other. The mean difference of interest rates between Canada and the 
U.S. is decreasing since 1990 and the difference between the volatility of interest 
rates in the two countries is almost always positive between 1985 and 1997. This 
suggests that interest rates decline more rapidly in Canada than in the U.S., thus the 
volatility of interest rates in Canada is higher than in the U.S. until 1998. Since 1998, 
Canada has a lower volatility of interest rates than the U.S. 
With money growth rate, there are four gradual breaks but since the 
correlation between money supply at time t and at time t-1 is around 99 percent, the 
structural break results are not reliable. The results for money growth are clearly 
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different from Canada. Since 1992, the difference between money growth rate in 
Canada and the U.S. is increasing. While money growth volatility difference moves 
around zero until 1997, Canada has a bigger volatility than the U.S. after 1998. 
In the U.S., there are three structural breaks for industrial production, four of 
which are before 1992. It can be seen that there is a gradual decline in production 
volatility starting from 1983 until 1999. The minimum of production volatility is 
achieved between 1992 and 1999. When we compare production growth of the U.S. 
and Canada we can see that the peaks and troughs are at the same years.  We can also 
see that Canada has generally a smaller production growth rate than the U.S., which 
is not necessarily because of the regime shift in Canada; the production growth is 
less in Canada than in the U.S. from 1988 onwards. We can also see that the 
difference between the production volatilities is smaller after 1988 than it was 
between 1981 and 1988 but still production volatility in Canada is almost always 
greater than in the U.S. so it is hard to conclude whether inflation targeting has any 
effect on Canada’s performance in terms of production volatility. 
So, the comparisons suggest that after the regime shift, Canada successfully 
kept inflation lower than the inflation in the U.S. but the volatility of inflation is 
generally higher in Canada. Until 1996 interest rates in Canada is always higher than 
in the U.S. and interest rate volatility is higher in Canada at all times. Money growth 
volatility and exchange rate volatility differences do not point to a regime shift in 
Canada when compared to the U.S. Canada has a lower production growth than the 
U.S. with a higher volatility which does not change with the new regime. 
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Figure 3.a.1 CPI inflation   Figure 3.a.2 CPI inflation std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.b.1 Exchange rate   Figure 3.b.2 Exchange rate std. dev. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.c.1 Interest rate   Figure 3.c.2 Interest rate std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.d.1 Money growth   Figure 3.d.2 Money growth std. dev. 
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Figure 3.e.1 Production growth  Figure 3.e.2 Prod. growth std.dev. 
 
4.4 Chile 
Table 4 summarises the results of structural break tests for Chile. Chile shifts 
to inflation targeting at January 1991.  
For CPI inflation there are three structural breaks. Volatility of inflation 
gradually declines over the last twenty years. The first break is at November 1982, 
the second at March 1986 and the third at April 1992, about one year after inflation 
targeting is introduced. It can be viewed from Figure 4.a.1 that there is gradual 
disinflation starting from 1991 and the volatility of inflation reduces to as low as 0.6 
percent after this date.  
For exchange rate, there are two breaks that are both at 1980s. Exchange rate 
volatility does not show any significant changes after 1986, which tells us that the 
introduction of inflation targeting did not cause exchange rate to become more 
volatile for Chile.  
Interest rate volatility is the monetary aggregate that shows significant 
upward and downward movements for Chile. By the start of 1980’s there are four 
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that there is a stable trend in volatility, however it can be viewed from the graphs that 
around 1990 there is a large increase in interest rates as well as in interest rate 
volatility. After about a year, interest rate is back to its 1989 value. With the adoption 
of inflation targeting, interest rate volatility drops to its minimum with an average of 
3 percent volatility.  
Money growth rate has five structural breaks. Between January 1981 and 
August 1988, there is a gradual decline in money growth volatility. There is a slight 
increase after 1988 and between March 1991 and April 1993, money growth 
volatility reaches its maximum of the twenty years analysed here. This increase is 
consistent with the time inflation volatility and interest rate volatility increase. We 
can see that production growth is at its trough at mid-1990 and interest rate and 
inflation are at their peak. The central bank successfully reverses this trend after the 
adoption of inflation targeting by the start of 1991. Disinflation starts, interest rates 
start to fall, production starts to increase and money growth increases. Since April 
1993, there are not any structural changes for money growth, which assures that 
money is not used aggressively to control inflation.  
Production growth volatility decreases continuously from the start of 1981 
until October 1990. Between October 1990 and September 1992 there is a slight 
increase in production growth volatility. After September 1992 there is no structural 
change and the volatility reaches its minimum of the last 15 years as well. What is 
more important is that this is not because that production growth stops; it stays 
around 4-5 percent until mid-1997. Since mid-1997 it is around zero, but this cannot 
be due to inflation targeting because the previous six years’ production growth with 
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inflation targeting is well above zero. The drop in production growth can be 
attributed to the effects of the Asian crisis. 
Within the two years before the introduction of inflation targeting in Chile, 
there are no changes in inflation volatility, exchange rate volatility and interest rate 
volatility. There are increases in money growth volatility and production growth 
volatility. After the new regime is employed, inflation volatility, interest rate 
volatility, money growth volatility and production growth volatility drops, there are 
no changes in exchange rate volatility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.a.1 CPI inflation   Figure 4.a.2 CPI inflation std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.b.1 Exchange rate   Figure 4.b.2 Exchange rate std. dev. 
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Figure 4.c.1 Interest rate   Figure 4.c.2 Interest rate std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.d.1 Money growth   Figure 4.d.2 Money growth std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.e.1 Production growth Figure 4.e.2 Prod. growth std. dev. 
 
4.5 Finland 
Except production growth, tests reveal structural breaks. The results are 
shown in Table 5. Finland shifts to inflation targeting at February 1993. 
For CPI inflation, there are five structural breaks. Until June 1987, there is a 
fall in inflation volatility. Between June 1987 and May 1995, there is a slight 
increase compared to the previous period but this also shows us that neither before 
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inflation targeting is introduced nor after the first two years with the new monetary 
regime there are not any structural changes in inflation volatility. After May 1995, 
there is a decrease again that lasts until 1999. That is the time Finland has moved to 
the European Monetary System. The increase after 1999 is probably due to this new 
regime.  
There are five structural breaks for exchange rate; there is an increase in 
exchange rate volatility between 1990 and 1993, a further increase until the end of 
1993. The test successfully captures 1992-1993 exchange rate crisis. There is a 
decrease in volatility for the year 1994, which is followed by an increase for the year 
1995. After 1995, exchange rate volatility does not change and stays well below the 
volatility between 1990 and 1995.  
For interest rate, there are five breaks; the results show that the volatility 
changes are remarkable. Starting from May 1983 until January 1993, interest rate 
volatility increases every time there is a structural change compared to the previous 
period. Interest rate volatility peaks for the year 1992. After January 1992, interest 
rate volatility does not change and is the minimum of the time span analysed here. 
This is because after the start of 1992, there is a more than 5-point reduction in 
interest rates and interest rates stay at the level of 3-5 percent. So there is a drastic 
increase in interest rate volatility one year before inflation targeting is introduced 
which is offset after inflation targeting is employed.  
With money growth, there aren’t any structural breaks until 1989. There is an 
increase in volatility of money growth rate at the year 1989, a decrease for the years 
1990 and 1991, and attains its minimum level between 1992 and 1998. After 1998, 
there is a break that is due to passing to European Monetary System.  
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Careful inspection of the production growth graph reveals the recession from 
1990 to 1994 but since this recession is gradual, there is not a structural break in the 
standard deviation of the production growth. Production growth stops at mid-1990 
and declines thereafter, the economy starts to recover by the start of 1993 and returns 
back to its production level before recession at 1994. Production growth swings 
around 5 percent after 1995, which indicates that inflation targeting does not reduce 
production growth as well as not inducing any increase in volatility compared to its 
before-inflation-targeting value.  
Within the two years before the introduction of inflation targeting in Finland, 
there is an increase in exchange rate volatility, a spike in interest rate volatility that 
may be due to the efforts to compensate the effects of the exchange rate crisis, and a 
decrease in money growth volatility. After the new regime is employed, inflation 
volatility, interest rate volatility and exchange rate volatility decreases; exchange rate 
volatility increases for the year 1995 and decreases again. Production growth 
volatility is slightly higher than the pre-inflation targeting values but production 
growth is on average higher after the regime change. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.a.1 CPI inflation   Figure 5.a.2 CPI inflation std. dev. 
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Figure 5.b.1 Exchange rate   Figure 5.b.2 Exchange rate std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.c.1 Interest rate   Figure 5.c.2 Interest rate std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.d.1 Money growth   Figure 5.d.2 Money growth std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.e.1 Production growth  Figure 5.e.2 Prod. growth std. dev. 
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4.6 Norway 
The structural break tests’ results are listed in Table 6. The comparisons with 
Finland are listed in the Figures 16-17. There are structural breaks only for money 
and production growth. We can see from the figures that Norway has a gradual 
disinflation starting from 1980s up to the start of 1990s that is similar to Finland. 
Different from Finland, structural break tests do suggest no break for inflation in 
Norway. Norwegian economy is dependent on oil and natural gas production and is 
vulnerable to fluctuations in foreign oil prices. We can see the upward movement in 
inflation variability around 1987 because of the oil price shock of 1985-86. Since 
1992 inflation is around 2 percent with a low volatility. From the difference tables it 
is apparent that inflation falls relatively more rapidly in Finland than in Norway from 
1989 onwards. This makes the volatility of inflation in Finland higher than in 
Norway at all times after 1989 except in 1996. 
Exchange rate figures suggest us that since 1993 there is an appreciation of 
the exchange rate. Similar to inflation volatility, we cannot see this change in 
structural break test results.  However, Norway is not severely affected by the 
exchange rate crisis in 1993 so the overall performance of Norway in 1990s in terms 
of exchange rate volatility is better than of Finland. 
Interest rate starts to decline from a peak of 14 percent in mid 1987 to as low 
as 5 percent at the end of 1999. The decline is gradual and we can see from the 
figures that with the exception around 1993, interest rate volatility is low. Interest 
rate volatility is more stable than in Finland throughout the 1980s until the beginning 
of 1993. Afterwards, Finland has a lower interest rate at all times with similar or 
lower volatility of interest rates most of the time.  
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Money growth results show us that there are five structural breaks; however 
the break in 1988 is caused by the lack of data between January 1987 and August 
1987 which in turn implies a lack of data between January 1987 and August 1988 for 
the log difference and even more for the standard deviation of the log difference. 
There is a spike in volatility between 1992 and 1994; afterwards volatility falls to the 
minimum of the twenty years. After 1997 it slightly increases. We can see that 
Finland has a more stable money growth volatility compared to Norway except in 
1991. 
 There are five structural breaks for industrial production four of which are 
before 1990. Between 1983 and 1987 there is an increase in volatility, between 1987 
and 1996 volatility declines and after 1996 it is the lowest of the twenty years. When 
we compare Finland and Norway we can see that Finland has a less volatile 
industrial production growth than Norway almost always. It is also true that the 
production growth of Finland is relatively higher than that of Norway starting from 
1993 onwards. 
 So, Finland has a lower inflation level than Norway after the new regime is 
adopted but it comes with the cost of higher inflation volatility most of the time. 
Norway exchange rate volatility is lower at all times but we can safely say that 
Finland performs better in terms of interest rate levels and volatility after inflation 
targeting is introduced. Money growth volatility is more stable in Finland than in 
Norway at all times. Industrial production growth levels are higher in Finland than in 
Norway with a lower volatility in general after inflation targeting is employed in 
Finland. 
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Figure 6.a.1 CPI inflation   Figure 6.a.2 CPI inflation std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.b.1 Exchange rate   Figure 6.b.2 Exchange rate std. dev. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.c.1 Interest rate   Figure 6.c.2 Interest rate std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.d.1 Money growth   Figure 6.d.2 Money growth std. dev. 
NO-CPI INFLATION SD
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.012
0.014
0.016
Ja
n
-8
1
Ja
n
-8
3
Ja
n
-8
5
Ja
n
-8
7
Ja
n
-8
9
Ja
n
-9
1
Ja
n
-9
3
Ja
n
-9
5
Ja
n
-9
7
Ja
n
-9
9
NO-CPI INFLATION
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
Ja
n
-8
1
Ja
n
-8
3
Ja
n
-8
5
Ja
n
-8
7
Ja
n
-8
9
Ja
n
-9
1
Ja
n
-9
3
Ja
n
-9
5
Ja
n
-9
7
Ja
n
-9
9
NO-INTEREST RATE SD
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
Ja
n
-8
0
Ja
n
-8
2
Ja
n
-8
4
Ja
n
-8
6
Ja
n
-8
8
Ja
n
-9
0
Ja
n
-9
2
Ja
n
-9
4
Ja
n
-9
6
Ja
n
-9
8
Ja
n
-0
0
NO-INTEREST RATE
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Ja
n
-8
0
Ja
n
-8
2
Ja
n
-8
4
Ja
n
-8
6
Ja
n
-8
8
Ja
n
-9
0
Ja
n
-9
2
Ja
n
-9
4
Ja
n
-9
6
Ja
n
-9
8
Ja
n
-0
0
NO-MONEY SD
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
Ja
n
-8
1
Ja
n
-8
3
Ja
n
-8
5
Ja
n
-8
7
Ja
n
-8
9
Ja
n
-9
1
Ja
n
-9
3
Ja
n
-9
5
Ja
n
-9
7
Ja
n
-9
9
NO-MONEY
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
Ja
n
-8
1
Ja
n
-8
3
Ja
n
-8
5
Ja
n
-8
7
Ja
n
-8
9
Ja
n
-9
1
Ja
n
-9
3
Ja
n
-9
5
Ja
n
-9
7
Ja
n
-9
9
NO-EXCHANGE RATE SD
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
Ja
n
-8
1
Ja
n
-8
3
Ja
n
-8
5
Ja
n
-8
7
Ja
n
-8
9
Ja
n
-9
1
Ja
n
-9
3
Ja
n
-9
5
Ja
n
-9
7
Ja
n
-9
9
NO-EXCHANGE RATE
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
Ja
n
-8
1
Ja
n
-8
3
Ja
n
-8
5
Ja
n
-8
7
Ja
n
-8
9
Ja
n
-9
1
Ja
n
-9
3
Ja
n
-9
5
Ja
n
-9
7
Ja
n
-9
9
 59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.e.1 Production growth  Figure 6.e.2 Prod. growth std.dev. 
 
4.7 Israel 
Israel shifts to inflation targeting at January 1992. As can be seen from Table 
7, there are 5 breaks for CPI inflation, all of them are before 1987 and they are 
related to the hyperinflation period. With a peak of 184% in November 1984, a rapid 
disinflation period starts. By July 1986 inflation is 20% and after this date there is a 
gradual decline in inflation. By January 1990 inflation is 10% and by July 1998 it is 
1.7%. To see the progression of disinflation a figure of inflation starting with July 
1986 is taken here. Figure 7.a.1 is 12-month moving average of inflation. Figure 
7.a.2 is 12-month moving average standard deviation of inflation. We can see that 
there is a permanent increase in volatility of inflation between 1989 and 1990 that 
fades away by 1992. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.a.1 Inflation after 1988        Figure 7.a.2 Inflation std. dev. after 1988 
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There are three devaluations in Israel that affect exchange rate volatility, in 
1987, in 1989 and in 1991. Since we take the 12-month log difference of exchange 
rates when calculating moving averages, these devaluations point to the times when 
the ‘price’ of exchange rate suddenly increases at Figure 7.b.1 below. Between 1991 
and 1993, there is an increase in volatility of exchange rates, which is followed by a 
decrease until 1997. There is another devaluation at September 1998. The sudden 
decrease in 1998 is when exchange rate drops from 114 at August 1998 to 97 at 
October 1998 and then starts to increase gradually. That is why exchange rate 
volatility has increased after October 1997.  
There aren’t any structural breaks for interest rate after 1986. The break at 
1986 points to the time when disinflation is successfully completed.  I did not include 
figures before 1986 with a concern about scaling.  
Money growth figures closely match inflation figures. At the times of 
hyperinflation, money growth rates make a peak and when inflation starts to fall 
money growth rate also starts to fall. Between 1986 and 1995 volatility does not 
change and after 1995 it decreases to its minimum value.  
Production growth has three structural breaks before 1992. Between May 
1989 and January 1992 there is a slight increase in production growth volatility 
compared to its level between June 1986 and May 1989. From January 1992 to April 
1998, volatility further decreases and reaches its minimum value. It can be said that 
introduction of inflation targeting does not cause production growth volatility to 
increase but causes it to decrease instead. It is important to note that between 1991 
and 1996, production growth is around 7 percent and between 1996 and 1998 around 
 61 
2 percent. These growth rates are consistent with the finding of the other countries 
analysed here that inflation targeting does not come at the cost of reduced production 
growth rates.  
So, within the two years before the introduction of inflation targeting in 
Israel, there is an increase in exchange rate volatility and there are no changes for 
other monetary aggregates. After inflation targeting is introduced, there is a decrease 
in exchange rate and a decrease in production growth volatility and there are no 
changes in the volatility of inflation, interest rates and money growth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.a.3 CPI inflation   Figure 7.a.4 CPI inflation std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.b.1 Exchange rate   Figure 7.b.2 Exchange rate std. dev. 
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Figure 7.c.1 Interest rate   Figure 7.c.2 Interest rate std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.d.1 Money growth   Figure 7.d.2 Money growth std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.e.1 Production growth  Figure 7.e.2 Prod. growth std. dev. 
 
4.8 New Zealand 
New Zealand shifts to inflation targeting at March 1990. There is no monthly 
data for CPI and production for New Zealand so the analysis cannot be done. The 
results are summarised in Table 8. For exchange rate there are five breaks three of 
which are before inflation targeting is introduced and the other two after. After 
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September 1986, there is a continuous decline in exchange rate volatility with breaks 
at August 1988, April 1993 and September 1996. After the last break there is an 
increase in exchange rate volatility.  
For interest rate, there are three breaks, all of which are before the 
introduction of inflation targeting. Since December 1988, interest rate volatility did 
not change. However, it is readily seen from Figure 8.b.1 that this does not mean that 
interest rates stayed at 15 % but this means that interest rates fell gradually to 7 
percent level.  
Money growth rate has five breaks. Three of the breaks are at June 1987, 
June 1988 and October 1989. There is an increase between October 1989 and August 
1991, which is followed by a decrease that endures until 1998.  
So, for New Zealand, within the two years before the introduction of inflation 
targeting, there is an increase in money growth volatility and there are no changes in 
exchange rate and interest rate volatility. After the adoption of inflation targeting, 
exchange rate and money growth volatility decrease. Interest rates decline but the 
volatility of interest rates remains unchanged. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.a.1 Exchange rate   Figure 8.a.2 Exchange rate std. dev.
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Figure 8.b.1 Interest rate   Figure 8.b.2 Interest rate std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.c.1 Money growth   Figure 8.c.2 Money growth std. dev. 
 
4.9 Spain 
Spain shifts to inflation targeting at November 1994. There are structural 
breaks for CPI inflation, exchange rate and interest rate as can be seen from Table 9. 
For inflation, all of the breaks are prior to inflation targeting. After November 1988, 
there are no significant standard deviation changes and inflation lies around 5 % with 
a minimum volatility compared to previous periods.  
For the exchange rate, the test successfully captures the speculative attacks of 
1993 and 1995. After a shock free period between 1984 and 1992, there is an 
increase in exchange rate volatility that lasts until March 1994. After March 1994, 
there is a decrease in exchange rate volatility that is followed by another decrease at 
May 1996. Since May 1996, volatility is at its minimum value.  
NZ-MONEY SD
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
Ja
n-
81
Ja
n-
83
Ja
n-
85
Ja
n-
87
Ja
n-
89
Ja
n-
91
Ja
n-
93
Ja
n-
95
Ja
n-
97
Ja
n-
99
Ja
n-
01
NZ-MONEY
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
Ja
n-
81
Ja
n-
83
Ja
n-
85
Ja
n-
87
Ja
n-
89
Ja
n-
91
Ja
n-
93
Ja
n-
95
Ja
n-
97
Ja
n-
99
Ja
n-
01
NZ-INTEREST RATE SD
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Ja
n-
80
Ja
n-
82
Ja
n-
84
Ja
n-
86
Ja
n-
88
Ja
n-
90
Ja
n-
92
Ja
n-
94
Ja
n-
96
Ja
n-
98
Ja
n-
00
NZ-INTEREST RATE
0
5
10
15
20
25
Ja
n-
80
Ja
n-
82
Ja
n-
84
Ja
n-
86
Ja
n-
88
Ja
n-
90
Ja
n-
92
Ja
n-
94
Ja
n-
96
Ja
n-
98
Ja
n-
00
 65 
For the interest rate, the changes are dramatic. The test captures the massive 
lending rate increase by the Bank of Spain at 1987. Between July 1987 and 
December 1988, there is an increase in interest rate volatility compared to the 
previous period. After December 1988 until February 1995, there is a decrease in 
volatility and volatility is the minimum of the period 1980-1995. After 1995 there is 
a further decrease in interest rate volatility and volatility becomes as low as 0.54 %. 
The interest rate levels drop gradually starting from 1992. 
There are no structural breaks for money growth rate and there are two 
gradual breaks for production growth rate that is taken from two-year moving 
average standard deviation test. Close inspection of Figure 9.d.1 and Figure 9.e.1 
tells us the adverse effects of the speculative shocks to the economy in 1993 and 
1995. Production growth becomes as low as –7.6 % at September 1992 and money 
growth hits –2.4% at December 1992. The gradual break that the test offers for 
production growth just covers these dates. After January 1993, production growth 
volatility declines to 0.08 %, but the persistence of production growth volatility must 
be taken into account for 0.08 % to be meaningful. The gradual break test suggests a 
high degree of persistence in volatility with the first coefficient in the table being 
95.6 %. This indicates that 95 percent of the volatility of production is passed from 
the previous period to the current one.  
So, for Spain, within the two years before adoption of inflation targeting, 
there are no structural changes in inflation volatility, an increase in exchange rate 
volatility due to exchange rate crisis of 1992-93, no changes for interest rate 
volatility and an increase in production growth volatility. After the adoption of 
 66 
inflation targeting, there are decreases in exchange rate, interest rate and production 
growth volatility. Inflation volatility and money growth volatility remains unaltered. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.a.1 CPI inflation   Figure 9.a.2 CPI inflation std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.b.1 Exchange rate   Figure 9.b.2 Exchange rate std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.c.1 Interest rate   Figure 9.c.2 Interest rate std. dev. 
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Figure 9.d.1 Money growth   Figure 9.d.2 Money growth std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.e.1 Production growth  Figure 9.e.2 Prod. growth std. dev. 
 
4.10 Sweden 
Sweden shifts to inflation targeting at January 1993. The results of the 
structural break tests are listed in Table 10. There are structural breaks for all of the 
monetary aggregates.  
For CPI inflation, four breaks are between 1989 and 1993. After a period of 
low volatility between 1982 and 1989, there are two increases in volatility that lasts 
until December 1991. It must noted that there are tax reforms in 1990 and 1991 when 
the VAT base is widened and prices then adjust to reflect these reforms. Between 
December 1991 and November 1993 there is a decrease in volatility and after 
November 1993 there are no structural changes and the inflation volatility is at its 
lowest level. We can see that after 1993, inflation stays between 0-2 percent.  
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For exchange rate, there are four breaks and the test captures the 1992-1993 
exchange rate crisis. After a period of low volatility between 1983 and January 1992, 
there is a significant increase in volatility that is persevered until the end of 1993. 
Between November 1993 and October 1996 there is a decrease and further decrease 
after October 1996.  
For interest rate there are five breaks. After an era of low volatility, volatility 
increases for the period July 1990 and November 1992. The increase is consistent 
with the exchange rate crisis. Volatility starts to decline attaining its minimum value 
after July 1996. Similarly, the level of interest rates starts to decrease at the 
beginning of 1992 and after July 1996 interest rates stay at the band 3.5-4.5 percent.  
There are 5 gradual breaks for money growth. The first coefficient shows the 
persistence of the money growth volatility. The subsequent terms are period 
coefficients. After the period between September 1983 and February 1989, there is 
an increase in money growth volatility, and another increase follows that lasts until 
June 1991. After this date, there are no structural breaks and money growth volatility 
stays at 0.5 percent.  
There are four breaks for production growth; the first two are at 1981 and 
1984. There is an increase in volatility after the period between 1984 and 1991 ends. 
There is a decrease in production volatility after the break at August 1993 and no 
further structural change exists. The dates of structural changes successfully capture 
the recession between 1990 and 1993. With production growth hitting the minimum 
of the twenty years analyzed here in 1991, it seems hard to claim that the subsequent 
good production growth performance would have been even better without inflation 
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targeting. After 1993, the level of production growth ranges from 5 to 10 percent 
until 1998.  
So, for Sweden, within the two years before the adoption of inflation 
targeting; there is first an increase then a decrease in inflation volatility, an increase 
in exchange rate volatility due to exchange rate crisis of 1992-93, first an increase 
then a decrease in interest rate volatility, a decrease in money growth volatility and 
an increase in production growth volatility. After the adoption of inflation targeting, 
inflation volatility decreases, exchange rate volatility decreases twice, interest rate 
volatility and production growth volatility decrease while money growth volatility 
does not change. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.a.1 CPI inflation   Figure 10.a.2 CPI inflation std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.b.1 Exchange rate  Figure 10.b.2 Exchange rate std. dev.
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Figure 10.c.1 Interest rate   Figure 10.c.2 Interest rate std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.d.1 Money growth  Figure 10.d.2 Money growth std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.e.1 Production growth  Figure 10.e.2 Prod. growth std. dev. 
 
4.11 Denmark 
There are structural breaks for all of the monetary aggregates. The results are 
listed in Table 11. The comparisons with Sweden are listed through the Figures 18-
19. For CPI inflation, all breaks are before 1990. We can see from the coefficients of 
the volatility between break dates that inflation volatility is very low in Denmark. 
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The lowest volatility of the twenty years is achieved after the break at 1990. We can 
also see from the figures that there is a very smooth disinflation period that ends 
approximately at 1990 and then inflation swings around 2 percent. Denmark is 
similar to Sweden in terms of inflation volatility except the period between 1990 and 
1991 when VAT is increased in Sweden that in turn triggered inflation. However, 
volatility of inflation in Sweden is greater than in Denmark before and after Sweden 
introduced inflation targeting. This is because Denmark stabilised its inflation at 2 
percent but Sweden let inflation to fluctuate in the 0-2 percent band. 
For exchange rate in Denmark, there are five breaks. After a period of low 
volatility between November 1987 and January 1989, there is a significant increase 
in volatility that is persevered until mid 1994. Between May 1994 and May 1997 
there is a decrease, which is followed by an increase that lasts in mid 1999. When we 
compare the volatilities of Denmark and Sweden, we can see that Sweden has a 
larger exchange rate volatility after the introduction of inflation targeting. 
For interest rate there are four breaks. There is an era of low volatility 
between 1982 and 1991, which is followed by an increase until the end of 1992. 
Afterwards volatility declines sharply attaining its minimum with a value of 0.47. 
We can also see from the figures that interest rates fall gradually since 1980 with the 
exception of the increase in 1992. When we compare Sweden and Denmark, we can 
conclude that after the consequences of the ERM crisis in 1993 are overcome; in 
general, Sweden managed to have a lower volatility of interest rates than Denmark.  
There aren’t any breaks for money growth. When we look at the figures we 
can see that money growth rate gradually declined over time and there is a significant 
increase in 1994 in the volatility of money growth. Comparing Denmark and 
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Sweden, we can say that since Sweden introduced inflation targeting, money is less 
volatile in Sweden than in Denmark.  
There are five breaks for production growth; the first two are at 1984 and 
1986. The minimum volatility of the period analyzed is reached between 1986 and 
1992. Between the end of 1992 and the end of 1993 the volatility doubles compared 
to the previous period and decreases afterwards. When we compare Sweden and 
Denmark, we see that production is less volatile in Sweden at all times after the 
introduction of inflation targeting with a higher average production growth until 
1997.  
To sum up, inflation is lower in Sweden than in Denmark with a higher 
volatility after the adoption of inflation targeting in Sweden. Exchange rate is 
significantly more volatile in Sweden after the regime shift. Interest rates and money 
growth rate are less volatile in Sweden after the adoption of inflation targeting but 
this cannot be confidently attributed to the regime change. Sweden manages to have 
a high production growth with a less volatile production growth than Denmark after 
the regime change. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.a.1 CPI inflation   Figure 11.a.2 CPI inflation std. dev. 
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Figure 11.b.1 Exchange rate  Figure 11.b.2 Exchange rate std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.c.1 Interest rate   Figure 11.c.2 Interest rate std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.d.1 Money growth  Figure 11.d.2 Money growth std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.e.1 Production growth  Figure 11.e.2 Prod. growth std. dev. 
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4.12 United Kingdom 
U.K. shifts to inflation targeting at October 1992. The structural break results 
are listed in Table 12. For CPI inflation, there are five structural breaks and all breaks 
are before the introduction of inflation targeting. After March 1991 inflation 
volatility is stable with the volatility being 0.0021. We can see from Figure 12.a.1 
that inflation is around 1 percent after 1993 and there are only minor movements in 
inflation rate.  
First break for exchange rate is at 1985. An increase in exchange rate 
volatility follows up to 1987. Between 1987 and October 1991, volatility decreases. 
But after the currency crisis begins there is an increase that endures till the end of 
1993. A decrease follows with standard deviation reaching its minimum level of the 
1980s and 1990s. After August 1995 there is no break and exchange rate volatility is 
higher than its previous level.  
For interest rate there are three breaks. Between May 1982 and August 1987 
interest rate volatility is low, it slightly increases until October 1992 and achieves its 
minimum afterwards with a volatility of 0.35. Also, there is a gradual decline in 
interest rate levels from 1990 to 1994 and afterwards interest rates swing around 5.5 
percent. 
Money growth rate volatility is stable between 1983 and 1987 with a standard 
deviation of 0.3 percent. There is a slight increase between 1987 and September 1990 
followed by a decrease to 0.3 percent level. After December 1998, there is an 
increase in money growth volatility for one year.  
There are three breaks for production growth rate. The first two are at 1983 
and 1985 that is caused by the minors’ strike in 1984. Between October 1984 and 
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December 1994 there are no breaks. Inspection of the production graph, Figure 
12.e.1, shows the recession between 1990 and 1992, which is followed by a rapid 
growth that offsets the effects of recession. After 1995 there are no structural 
changes, production volatility is at its minimum with a 0.7 percent and production 
growth rate is around 1 percent.  
For U.K., within the two years before inflation targeting is adopted; inflation 
volatility first increases then decreases, exchange rate volatility increases due to the 
exchange rate crisis of 1992-93, money growth volatility decreases, and interest rate 
and production growth volatilities do not change. After the adoption of inflation 
targeting, inflation volatility increases between 1997 and 1998 and then drops again, 
exchange rate volatility decreases from September 1993 to August 1995 and slightly 
increases thereafter, interest rate volatility decreases, money growth volatility 
increases between 1997 and 1998 and then decreases again and production volatility 
decreases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12.a.1 CPI inflation   Figure 12.a.2 CPI inflation std. dev. 
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Figure 12.b.1 Exchange rate  Figure 12.b.2 Exchange rate std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12.c.1 Interest rate   Figure 12.c.2 Interest rate std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12.d.1 Money growth  Figure 12.d.2 Money growth std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12.e.1 Production growth  Figure 512.e.2 Prod. growth std. dev. 
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4.13 France 
 The structural break test results are listed in Table 13. Except money growth, 
there are structural breaks for France. The Figures 20-21 in the appendix are the 
comparison graphs of U.K. with France.  
For CPI inflation there are five breaks all of which are before 1987. After 
1987 disinflation is completed and a period with a low volatility of inflation emerges. 
We can see that the volatility coefficient is as low as 0.2 percent. When we compare 
U.K. with France we can see that except the period between October 1988 and May 
1991, the volatility of inflation is most of the time lower in the U.K than in France 
and inflation is also almost always lower in the U.K. than in France before and after 
the introduction of inflation targeting in U.K. 
For exchange rate there are four breaks. From February 1984 to April 1990 
exchange rate volatility is decreasing. There is an increase that lasts until 1994 due to 
the ERM crisis. After mid-1994, exchange rate is less volatile compared to the 
previous periods with a volatility coefficient of 1.2 percent. The difference between 
the exchange rate volatilities in U.K. and France is almost always positive and does 
not change with the introduction of inflation targeting in U.K. 
The tests do not suggest any breaks for interest rate. We can see that there is a 
decreasing trend in interest rates, which is in line with the disinflation period but 
takes longer than inflation. We can also see from the figures that at time of the ERM 
crisis, interest rate volatility increases and interest rates stay at a high level. We can 
see from the figures that there is a clear difference between U.K. and France before 
and after the introduction of inflation targeting in U.K. Between August 1981 and 
August 1992, interest rate volatility in U.K. is higher than in France almost always. 
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After August 1992 till June 1996, the volatility in U.K. is lower than in France at all 
times with one exception. This period matches with the time U.K. has a lower level 
of interest rate than France. But between June 1996 and June 1999 volatility in U.K. 
is again greater than in France because of the increasing level of the interest rate 
differences between these countries; while interest rate in the U.K. fluctuates around 
5 percent, it is around 3 percent in France. 
There are five breaks for money growth; three of them are between 1986 and 
1990. Money growth volatility is higher between August 1989 and November 1993 
compared to the previous period, it then decreases for one year and finally after 
December 1994, it stays at a higher level than the previous seven years. We can see 
from the figures that there is an increasing trend in average money growth after the 
last break at 1994, which in turn brings a higher volatility. We can see from the 
figures that regardless of the money growth rate differences, volatility of money is 
greater in France than in U.K. at all times. 
There are four breaks in production growth. Three breaks are between 1993 
and mid-1995. After June 1995, production volatility decreases and it further 
decreases after mid-1999. The breaks in 1993-95 are due to the sharp decline in 
production growth in 1993. We can see from the figures that between October 1991 
and June 1996, U.K. production growth is higher than in France with the exception 
of eleven months in 1994. After June 1996, production growth is at all times lower in 
U.K. than in France. Starting from December 1991 production volatility is lower in 
U.K until May 2000. Whether the production level is higher or lower, U.K. managed 
to have lower production volatility than France after 1992. 
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To sum up, inflation is lower in the U.K. almost always and also inflation 
volatility is most of the time lower in the U.K. with the exception of the period 
between October 1988 and May 1991. Exchange rate volatility is always higher in 
the U.K. and money growth volatility is always higher in France. Both the level and 
the volatility of interest rates are higher in the U.K. at all times except the period of 
the ERM crisis that affected France more severely. After inflation targeting is 
introduced production volatility is lower in the U.K. but the production growth levels 
are also lower especially after mid-1996. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13.a.1 CPI inflation   Figure 13.a.2 CPI inflation std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13.b.1 Exchange rate  Figure 13.b.2 Exchange rate std. dev. 
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Figure 13.c.1 Interest rate   Figure 13.c.2 Interest rate std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13.d.1 Money growth  Figure 13.d.2 Money growth std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13.e.1 Production growth  Figure 13.e.2 Prod. growth std. dev. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion 
 
In this thesis we analyze nine countries that adopted inflation targeting 
between 1990 and 1995: Australia, Canada, Chile, Finland, Israel, New Zealand, 
Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. We try to investigate the impact of inflation 
targeting on the volatility of output growth, interest rate, exchange rate, inflation and 
money.  
There are two particular differences of this thesis other than the works in the 
literature. First, different from the approaches used in the literature, we make 
structural break tests on the monetary aggregates. The results tell us whether there is 
a structural break in the monetary aggregate analysed as well as what the effect of the 
structural break is if there exists one. We also try to interpret these changes and try to 
figure out whether the changes in volatility are the results of the changes in the level 
or not. This is particularly important for output growth and inflation volatilities since 
it is desirable to have a high level of output growth with a low volatility and a low 
level of inflation with a low volatility. However, a decline in output volatility might 
be the consequence of a decline in output growth and a decline in the level of 
inflation not always implies a decline in the volatility of inflation. The second 
difference is, we not only look at the changes in inflation, output and interest rate 
variability, as is the case in the literature of inflation targeting, but also search for 
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changes in exchange rate and money variability. The results provide important 
insights on whether inflation targeting central banks excessively use money and 
exchange rate to control inflation. We also compare the results of Canada with 
United States, United Kingdom with France, Sweden with Denmark and Finland 
with Norway. 
The main finding is, inflation targeting countries well managed to improve 
their performance in terms of the volatilities of monetary aggregates. Despite the fact 
that there are upward movements in the volatilities of monetary aggregates at the 
time of the regime shift in inflation targeting countries, after the adoption of inflation 
targeting, in general, the volatilities declined. After the adoption of inflation 
targeting, the most notable declines are in the volatilities of exchange rates and 
interest rates. Interest rate volatility declines in Australia, Canada, Chile, Finland, 
Spain, Sweden and U.K. and remains unchanged in Israel and New Zealand. 
Exchange rate volatility decreases in Australia, Finland, Israel, New Zealand, Spain 
and Sweden. It remains unchanged in Canada and Chile and slightly increases after 
1995 in the U.K. There aren’t any notable increases in inflation volatility and 
production growth volatility in any of the countries analyzed and also there are 
decreases in inflation volatility in Canada, Chile, Finland and Sweden and decreases 
in production growth volatility in Chile, Israel, Spain, Sweden and U.K. Money 
growth volatility remains unchanged or decreases in all the countries but in the U.K. 
for a short period of time.  
The above results suggest that producing decreased inflation and output 
volatility does not come with the cost of increased interest rate volatility or exchange 
rate volatility. Moreover, all inflation targeting countries managed stable low 
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inflations and low interest rates except Israel where interest rates are notably higher 
than inflation at all times. However, not all of the inflation targeting countries 
managed to sustain high output growth levels. Canada, Finland, Israel and Sweden 
sustains high output growth levels after the introduction of inflation targeting but in 
Chile, Spain and the U.K. production growth is fluctuating making it hard to 
conclude whether it could have been better without inflation targeting or not. The 
results on the levels of exchange rates and money growth rates are far from being 
conclusive.  
When we compare Canada with U.S., we see that Canada does not perform as 
well as U.S. in terms of volatilities before and after the introduction of inflation 
targeting except for exchange rate. After the introduction of inflation targeting 
Canada successfully achieves a lower CPI inflation than the U.S. and also the 
differences between the levels of interest rate and production growth in Canada and 
U.S. are either declining or negative which implies that the relative performance of 
Canada has been improving after the adoption of inflation targeting. For Finland 
there is a change in trend when compared to Norway after the introduction of 
inflation targeting. Production growth is bigger and interest rate and inflation levels 
are smaller when compared to Norway after the introduction of inflation targeting. 
Production growth volatility and interest rate volatility are smaller but inflation 
volatility and exchange rate volatility are usually higher than in Norway. When 
Sweden is compared to Denmark, it is seen that after Sweden introduced inflation 
targeting, Sweden has a lower inflation level than Denmark with a higher volatility. 
Moreover, Sweden manages to have a higher production growth with a lower 
volatility than Denmark however interest rates do not follow the decline in inflation. 
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After inflation targeting is implemented, Sweden has also lower volatility in interest 
rates and money growth but lower volatilities cannot be safely attributed to the 
regime change. Exchange rate is more volatile in Sweden especially after inflation 
targeting is introduced. When we compare U.K. with France, we find that the 
volatility and the level of inflation is almost always lower in the U.K. before and 
after inflation targeting, exchange rate is always more volatile in U.K., money 
growth is always more volatile in France. After the introduction of inflation targeting 
in U.K. there is a clear evidence of declining production and interest rate volatility, 
however production growth level is also lower in the U.K. especially after mid-1996 
and the relative interest rate volatility increases after mid-1996.  
So, the results clearly suggest that inflation targeting countries successfully 
lowered their inflation levels below the benchmark countries’ inflation levels. 
However, except U.K. inflation volatilities are higher in inflation targeting countries. 
Sweden and Finland manage to sustain high production growth levels with low 
production growth volatilities compared to the benchmark countries but this is not 
the case for U.K. and Canada. Interest rate level differences are declining in Canada 
and Finland but not in the U.K. and Sweden. There is a relative improvement in 
interest rate volatilities after the regime change in all countries except Canada. 
Exchange rate is always more volatile in the inflation targeting countries. Money 
growth is less volatile in the U.K., Sweden and Finland but not in Canada. So there 
isn’t any clear pattern of how inflation targeting countries perform relative to the 
benchmark countries and the relative success of the regime changes from one 
country to another. 
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To conclude, up to now, inflation targeting countries managed to perform 
well but the comparisons of the performance of the four benchmark countries suggest 
that it is far from conclusive how inflation targeting performs relative to other 
monetary regimes. But since inflation targeting is still a new regime, more time and 
experience with the new regime are needed to evaluate the performance of inflation 
targeting as a monetary policy. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
List of Tables 
 
 
Table 1. Australia Structural Break Test Results 
 
Shift Date: Sep.1994 
 CPI Exchange 
rate 
Interest 
Rate 
Money Production 
Type of Shift Sudden Sudden Sudden 
and 
Gradual 
No 
Break1 
No Data 
Number of 
Breaks 
5 4 4   
1 0.008154
(0.000437)  
0.037331
(0.002060)
1.543665
(0.051228)
  
2 0.011466
(0.000580)  
0.076040
(0.001647)
1.982234
(0.063960)
  
3 0.020498
(0.000729)  
0.037697
(0.001661)
1.289783
(0.050288)
  
4 0.015703
(0.000580)  
0.059276
(0.002682)
0.620894
(0.063039)
  
5 0.005285
(0.000624)  
0.046894
(0.001751)
0.335506
(0.043354)
  
Coefficients 
and Standard 
Errors of 
Variables 
 
 
6 0.009655
(0.000590)  
    
1 May-85 Mar-84 May-84   
2 Nov-87 Apr-89 Mar-87   
3 Jun-89 Apr-94 Oct-91   
4 Dec-91 Mar-96 Sep-94   
Break Dates 
From 
Bai-Perron 
Test 
5 Feb-94     
 
                                                 
1 Both 10 and 5 percent trimming do not reveal any breaks. 
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Table 2. Canada Structural Break Test Results 
Shift Date: Feb 1991 
 CPI Exchange 
rate 
Interest 
Rate 
Money Industrial 
Production 
Type of Shift Sudden2 No Break3 Sudden Sudden Sudden 
Number of 
Breaks 
5  5 5 3 
1 0.005600
(0.000576)
 2.379674
(0.051588)
0.022251
(0.000834)
0.056011
(0.001556)
2 0.015212
(0.000622)
 0.900472
(0.043802)
0.015583
(0.000834)
0.038216
(0.001505)
3 0.003189
(0.000237)
 0.661660
(0.041897)
0.020265
(0.000802)
0.02353
(0.00153)  
4 0.008074
(0.000650)
 1.163102
(0.049260)
0.012603
(0.000411)
0.015755
(0.000691)
5 0.015254
(0.000650)
 0.884072
(0.043802)
0.007701
(0.000712)
 
Coafficients 
and Standard 
Errors of 
Variables 
6 0.004537
(0.000208)
 0.368695
(0.039454)
0.031104
(0.000691)
 
1 Feb-82  Jul-82 Dec-82 May-83 
2 Feb-83  Feb-86 Dec-84 Dec-85 
3 Jan-90  Jan-90 Feb-87 Jun-88 
4 Dec-90  Nov-92 May-95  
Break Dates 
From 
Bai-Perron 
Test 
5 Nov-91  Jun-96 Feb-98  
 
                                                 
2 5 percent trimming result 
3 Both 10 and 5 percent trimming do not suggest break. 
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Table 3. U.S. Structural Break Test Results 
 
 CPI Exchange 
rate 
Interest 
Rate 
Money Production 
Type of Shift Sudden Sudden 
and 
Gradual 
No 
Break 
Gradual Sudden 
Number of 
Breaks 
5 5  4 5 
1 0.012219 
(0.000348) 
0.038977 
(0.001593) 
 0.993313 
(0.018963) 
0.030533 
(0.001284) 
2 0.004462 
(0.000282) 
0.100663 
(0.003257) 
 -0.000064 
(0.000373) 
0.050613 
(0.001643) 
3 0.008851 
(0.000348) 
0.035735 
(0.001021) 
 0.002288 
(0.000595) 
0.027147 
(0.001407) 
4 0.003166 
(0.000282) 
0.050132 
(0.003257) 
 -0.003040 
(0.000744) 
0.012386 
(0.000581) 
5 0.007454 
(0.000357) 
0.020671 
(0.002252) 
 0.000092 
(0.000280) 
0.008301 
(0.000567) 
Coefficients 
and Standard 
Errors of 
Variables 
 
 
6 0.002489 
(0.000151) 
0.036962 
(0.0018) 
 0.002271 
(0.000606) 
0.021637 
(0.001643) 
1 Sep-1982 Oct-1984  Oct-1985 Jun-1982 
2 May-1985 Sep-1985  Jan-1987 May-1983 
3 Feb-1987 Jan-1995  Dec-1987 Aug-1984 
4 Oct-1989 Dec-1995  Oct-1999 Dec-1991 
Break Dates 
From 
Bai-Perron 
Test 
5 Jun-1991 Nov-1997   Oct-1999 
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Table 4. Chile Structural Break Test Results 
Shift Date: Jan 1991 
 CPI Exchange 
rate 
Interest 
Rate 
Money Industrial 
Production 
Type of Shift Gradual 
and 
Sudden 
Sudden Sudden4 Gradual 
and 
Sudden 
Sudden4 
Number of Breaks 3 2 5 5 5 
1 0.054158
(0.001568)
0.132283
(0.004479)
7.018249
(0.531029)
0.110191
(0.002280)
0.103418
(0.002732)
2 0.043322
(0.001189)
0.077547
(0.004337)
18.083997
(0.735177)
0.044512
(0.002633)
0.083117
(0.002732)
3 0.020121
(0.000880)
0.036371
(0.001854)
5.703711
(0.735177)
0.026657
(0.002150)
0.047086
(0.001433)
4 0.006540
(0.000741)
 21.040924
(0.735177)
0.040795
(0.002317)
0.037122
(0.001211)
Coefficients 
and Standard 
Errors of 
Variables 
5   8.436490
(0.245059)
0.181017
(0.002580)
0.052406
(0.001889)
Coefficients 
and Standard 
6   3.062782
(0.277871)
0.028005
(0.001337)
0.033613
(0.000920)
1 Nov-82 Jun-83 Nov-81 Aug-83 Nov-81 
2 Mar-86 Feb-86 Nov-82 Aug-85 Oct-82 
3 Apr-92  Nov-83 Aug-88 Feb-86 
4   Nov-84 Mar-91 Oct-90 
Break Dates 
From 
Bai-Perron 
Test 
5   Jan-95 Apr-93 Sep-92 
 
                                                 
4 5 percent trimming results 
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Table 5. Finland Structural Break Test Results 
Shift Date: Feb 1993 
 CPI Exchange 
rate 
Interest 
Rate 
Money Industrial 
Production 
Type of Shift Sudden Sudden Sudden Sudden No Break 
Number of 
Breaks 
5 5 5 5  
1 0.009081
(0.000373)
0.018090
(0.000941)
0.486317
(0.055446)
0.014358 
( 0.003352)
 
2 0.006577
(0.000251)
0.039495
(0.001843)
1.628567
(0.086194)
0.061989    
(0.008823)
 
3 0.002154
(0.000395)
0.075015
(0.003044)
0.837883
(0.036753)
 0.171199    
(0.007204)
 
4 0.005444
(0.000167)
0.038040
(0.002800)
1.403277
(0.048437)
0.009811    
(0.003864)
 
5 0.003042
(0.000243)
0.070994
(0.003044)
2.233378
(0.086194)
0.321807    
(0.007038)
 
Coefficients 
and 
Standard 
Errors of 
Variables 
6 0.006371
(0.000364)
0.021477
(0.001314)
0.434800
(0.030797)
0.035921    
(0.009953)
 
1 Jul-82 Jul-90 May-82 Jan-89  
2 Jan-86 Jan-93 May-83 Mar-90  
3 Jun-87 Dec-93 Nov-88 Dec-91  
4 May-95 Jan-95 Jan-92 Jan-98  
Break Dates 
From 
Bai-Perron 
Test 
5 Feb-99 Dec-95 Jan-93 Nov-99  
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Table 6. Norway Structural Break Test Results 
 
 
                                                 
5 The second break is due to missing data between Jan 1987 and Sep 1987. 
 CPI Exchange 
rate 
Interest 
Rate 
Money Production 
Type of Shift No Break No Break No Break Sudden5 Sudden and 
Gradual 
Number of 
Breaks 
   5 5 
1    0.023363 
(0.001285) 
0.051054 
(0.001356) 
2    0.000000 
(0.001803) 
0.034398 
(0.001864) 
3    0.030619 
(0.001568) 
0.098241 
(0.002193) 
4    0.077445 
(0.002140) 
0.111561 
(0.002384) 
5    0.020170 
(0.001629) 
0.049366 
(0.000775) 
Coefficients 
and Standard 
Errors of 
Variables 
 
 
6    0.039648 
(0.001514) 
0.026198 
(0.001086) 
1    Jan-1986 Oct-1983 
2    Aug-1988 Apr-1984 
3    Jan-1992 May-1986 
4    Nov-1993 Apr-1987 
Break Dates 
From 
Bai-Perron 
Test 
5    Jan-1997 Dec-1995 
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Table 7. Israel Structural Break Test Results 
Shift Date: Jan 1992 
 CPI Exchange 
rate 
Interest 
Rate 
Money Industrial 
Production 
Type of Shift Sudden6 Sudden6 No 
Break7 
Gradual 
and 
Sudden 
Sudden 
Number of Breaks 5 5  3 5 
1 0.060801
(0.004444)
0.037212
(0.002421)
 0.059432
(0.004433)
0.034634
(0.000848)
2 0.233310
(0.006833)
0.079060
(0.003424)
 0.184156
(0.003792)
0.042087
(0.001160)
3 0.145196
(0.006833)
0.033876
(0.001171)
 0.062230
(0.002381)
0.034099
(0.000940)
4 0.308093
(0.005861)
0.043597
(0.002539)
 0.034314
(0.003083)
0.046168
(0.000983)
5 0.044128
(0.006833)
0.020004
(0.001531)
  0.023410
(0.000642)
Coefficients 
and Standard 
Errors of 
Variables 
6 0.014406
(0.001770)
0.055157
(0.001919)
  0.034333
(0.001160)
1 Feb-83 Oct-82  Jun-83 Jul-84 
2 Jan-84 Sep-83  Nov-86 Jun-86 
3 Dec-84 Jul-91  Jul-95 May-89 
4 Mar-86 Mar-93   Jan-92 
Break Dates 
From 
Bai-Perron 
Test 
5 Feb-87 Oct-97   Apr-98 
 
                                                 
6 5 percent trimming results 
7 There is one break at November 1985 
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Table 8. New Zealand Structural Break Test Results 
Shift Date: March 1990 
 Exchange rate Interest Rate Money 
Type of Shift Sudden Sudden Sudden8 
Number of 
Breaks 
5 3 5 
1 0.026529
(0.002972)  
0.083619
(0.152479)  
0.036889
(0.001027)
2 0.097878
(0.002846)  
2.654578
(0.165534)  
0.058530
(0 002618)
3 0.072827
(0.003560)  
1.589560
(0.152479)  
0.028345
(0 002268)
4 0.038239
(0.002282)  
0.797861
(0.069906)  
0.063105
(0.001934)
5 0.018729
(0.002666)  
 0.027362
(0.001034)
Coefficients 
and 
Standard 
Errors of 
Variables 
6 0.046424
(0.002490)  
 0.047416
(0.001512)
1 Sep-83 Nov-83 Jun-87 
2 Sep-86 Mar-86 Jun-88 
3 Aug-88 Dec-88 Oct-89 
4 Apr-93  Aug-91 
Break Dates 
From 
Bai-Perron 
Test 
5 Sep-96  Jan-98 
 
                                                 
8 5 percent trimming results 
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Table 9. Spain Structural Break Test Results 
Shift Date: Nov 1994 
 CPI Exchange 
rate 
Interest 
Rate 
Money Industrial 
Production 
Type of Shift Sudden9 Sudden9 Sudden9 No Break10 Gradual11 
Number of Breaks 5 5 5  2 
1 0.002329
(0.000209)
0.035658
(0.002235)
2.107796
(0.104002)
 0.955924
(0.010832)
2 0.003691
(0.000111)
0.071796
(0.001889)
3.191779
(0.080559)
 0.000768
(0.000250)
3 0.002655
(0.000209)
0.026533
(0.000879)
1.220214
(0.081937)
 0.003476
(0.000525)
4 0.005828
(0.000209)
0.044352
(0.001698)
2.757013
(0.107017)
 0.000804
(0.000386)
5 0.002630
(0.000145)
0.025159
(0.001698)
0.914720
(0.051293)
  
Coefficients 
and Standard 
Errors of 
Variables 
6 0.001577
(0.000058)
0.013054
(0.001178)
0.543030
(0.048433)
  
1 Nov-81 Mar-82 Jun-81  Apr-90 
2 Feb-85 Dec-83 Dec-83  Jan-93 
3 Jan-86 Jan-92 Jul-87   
4 Dec-86 Mar-94 Dec-88   
Break Dates 
From 
Bai-Perron 
Test 
5 Nov-88 May-96 Feb-95   
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
9 5 percent trimming results 
10 Both 10 and 5 percent did not reveal breaks 
11 Taken from 2 year moving average standard deviation 10 percent structural change test 
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Table 10. Sweden Structural Break Test Results 
Shift Date: January 1993 
 CPI Exchange 
rate 
Interest 
Rate 
Money Industrial 
Production 
Type of Shift Sudden12 Gradual 
and 
Sudden 
Gradual 
and 
Sudden 
Gradual12 Sudden13 
Number of Breaks 5 4 5 5 4 
1 0.013889
(0.000848)
0.053081
(0.002404)
1.888218
(0.067585)
0.767536
(0.026926)
0.042380
(0.002493)
2 0.006120
(0.000300)
0.016048
(0.001381)
1.370807
(0.076501)
0.005463
(0.001829)
0.019545
(0.001373)
3 0.012283
(0.000599)
0.089757
(0.002945)
0.720989
(0.058891)
0.016769
(0.002009)
0.028632
(0.000860)
4 0.024571
(0.000848)
0.052780
(0.002335)
1.944933
(0.081783)
0.003438
(0.000883)
0.039870
(0.001577)
5 0.011570
(0.000586)
0.036323
(0.002404)
0.752657
(0.065241)
0.011461
(0.002095)
0.025850
(0.000971)
6 0.005232
(0.000309)
 0.256129
(0.061201)
0.020120
(0.002389)
 
Coefficients 
and Standard 
Errors of 
Variables 
7    0.005551
(0.000898)
 
1 Nov-81 Sep-83 May-83 Nov-81 Oct-81 
2 Mar-89 Jan-92 Jan-86 Sep-83 Jul-84 
3 Jan-91 Nov-93 Jul-90 Feb-89 Jul-91 
4 Dec-91 Oct-96 Nov-92 Feb-90 Aug-93 
Break Dates 
From 
Bai-Perron 
Test 
5 Nov-93  Jul-96 Jun-91  
 
                                                 
 
12 5 percent trimming results 
13 10 percent trimming gives 2 breaks at July 1991and August 1993 with 0.0273, 0.0398 and 0.0258 
coefficients respectively. 
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Table 11. Denmark Structural Break Test Results 
 
 CPI Exchange 
rate 
Interest 
Rate 
Money Production 
Type of Shift Sudden Sudden Sudden 
and 
Gradual 
No 
Break14 
Sudden and 
Gradual 
Number of 
Breaks 
5 5 4  5 
1 0.009533 
(0.000268) 
0.025497 
(0.000892) 
3.247719 
(0.078307) 
 0.030293 
(0.000977) 
2 0.005172 
(0.000344) 
0.011058 
(0.002171) 
2.175021 
(0.093887) 
 0.049689 
(0.001133) 
3 0.007626 
(0.00025) 
0.028645 
(0.001015) 
0.635775 
(0.036477) 
 0.029036 
(0.000704) 
4 0.002904 
(0.000309) 
0.016528 
(0.001354) 
2.878211 
(0.086157) 
 0.051318 
(0.001839) 
5 0.008668 
(0.000427) 
0.04826 
(0.001658) 
0.474536 
(0.042798) 
 0.031779 
(0.00093) 
Coefficients 
and Standard 
Errors of 
Variables 
 
 
6 0.002889 
(0.000124) 
0.014805 
(0.001915) 
  0.044502 
(0.001196) 
1 Apr-1983 Nov-1987 Nov-1981  Mar-1984 
2 Sep-1984 Jan-1989 May-1982  Aug-1986 
3 May-1987 May-1994 Mar-1991  Nov-1992 
4 Feb-1989 May-1997 Oct-1992  Oct-1993 
Break Dates 
From 
Bai-Perron 
Test 
5 Jan-1990 May-1999   Feb-1997 
                                                 
14 Both 10 and 5 percent trimming do not reveal any breaks 
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Table 12. United Kingdom Structural Break Test Results 
Shift Date: October 1992 
 CPI Exchange 
rate 
Interest 
Rate 
Money Industrial 
Production 
Type of Shift Sudden15 Sudden Sudden Sudden15 Sudden16 
Number of Breaks 5 5 3 5 3 
1 0.003977
(0.00352)
0.051609
(0.001934)
1.351195
(0.059745)
0.008830
(0.000208)
0.020732
(0.000989)
2 0.006822
(0.000352)
0.069295
(0.002991)
0.793498
(0.040535)
0.003182
(0.000129)
0.031655
(0.001059)
3 0.001808
(0.000275)
0.040660
(0.001989)
0.999493
(0.040861)
0.005043
(0.000158)
0.014533
(0.000525)
4 0.003490
(0.000138)
0.061623
(0.002991)
0.352607
(0.032837)
0.003267
(0.000098)
0.007691
(0.000658)
5 0.007449
(0.000352)
0.021930
(0.002991)
 0.007958
(0.000284)
 
Coefficients 
and Standard 
Errors of 
Variables 
6 0.002106
(0.000109)
0.041452
(0.001807)
 0.005440
(0.000294)
 
1 Nov-81 Jul-85 May-82 Oct-82 Jul-83 
2 Oct-82 Jun-87 Aug-87 Jul-87 Oct-85 
3 Apr-84 Oct-91 Oct-92 Sep-90 Dec-94 
4 Apr-90 Sep-93  Dec-98  
Break Dates 
From 
Bai-Perron 
Test 
5 Mar-91 Aug-95  Nov-99  
 
                                                 
15 5 percent trimming results. 
16 10 percent trimming results, 5 percent did not reveal any break. 
 
 103 
Table 13. France Structural Break Test Results 
 
 CPI Exchange 
rate 
Interest 
Rate 
Money Production 
Type of Shift Sudden Sudden17 No Break Sudden Sudden 
and 
Gradual 
Number of 
Breaks 
5 4  5 4 
1 0.006880 
(0.000574) 
0.030369 
(0.000832) 
 0.011246 
(0.000356) 
0.015198 
(0.000291) 
2 0.012520 
(0.000574) 
0.017649 
(0.000969) 
 0.023712 
(0.000893) 
0.031025 
(0.001065) 
3 0.006050 
(0.000366) 
0.012382 
(0.000756) 
 0.012395 
(0.000507) 
0.023232 
(0.000883) 
4 0.011044 
(0.000574) 
0.023170 
(0.000740) 
 0.018370 
(0.000395) 
0.016368 
(0.000515) 
5 0.005477 
(0.000574) 
0.012419 
(0.000577) 
 0.013991 
(0.000783) 
0.009104 
(0.000883) 
Coefficients 
and Standard 
Errors of 
Variables 
 
 
6 0.002752 
(0.000147) 
  0.022211 
(0.000464) 
 
1 Nov-1981 Feb-84  Mar-1986 Mar-1993 
2 Oct-1982 Jun-86  Jan-1987 Feb-1994 
3 Jan-1985 Apr-90  Aug-1989 Jun-1995 
4 Dec-1985 Apr-94  Nov-1993 May-1999 
Break Dates 
From 
Bai-Perron 
Test 
5 Nov-1986   Dec-1994  
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Taken from 10 percent trimming 
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 Table 14. Data 
 PRICES EXCHANGE 
RATE 
INTEREST 
RATE 
MONEY PRODUCTION 
Description 
of Data 
Prices: 
Manufacturing 
Output 
[No Monthly 
Data for CPI] 
Reer Based on 
Rnulc 
13 Weeks' 
Treasury 
Bills 
Money No data 
Data Starts Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80  
Australia 
Data Ends June 97 Aug 2001 Oct 01 Sep 01  
Description 
of Data 
Consumer 
Prices 
Reer Based on 
Rnulc 
Treasury 
Bill Rate 
Monetary 
Base 
Seasonally 
Adjusted 
[Datastream] 
Industrial 
Production 
Seasonally 
Adjusted 
Data Starts Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 
Canada 
Data Ends Sep 01 Sep 01 Oct 01 Jan 02 Aug 01 
Description 
of Data 
Consumer 
Prices 
Reer Based on 
Rnulc 
Treasury 
Bill Rate 
M1, 
Seasonally 
Adjusted 
Industrial 
Production 
Seasonally 
Adjusted 
Data Starts Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 
U.S. 
Data Ends Sep 01 Oct 01 Jan 01 Sep 01 Jan 01 
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Description 
of Data 
Consumer 
Prices 
Reer Based on 
Rnulc 
Deposit 
Rate 
Monetary 
Base 
Seasonally 
Adjusted 
[Datastream] 
Manufacturing 
Production 
Data Starts Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 
Chile 
Data Ends Oct 01 Aug 01 Oct 01 Jan 02 Sep 01 
Description 
of Data 
Consumer 
Prices 
Reer Based on 
Rnulc 
Average 
Cost of 
Central 
Bank Debt 
Currency in 
Circulation 
plus Demand 
Deposits 
Industrial 
Production 
Seasonally 
Adjusted 
Data Starts Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 
Finland 
Data Ends Sep 01 Oct 01 Oct 01 Oct 01 Sep 01 
Description 
of Data 
Consumer 
Prices 
Reer Based on 
Rnulc 
Government 
Bond Yield 
Money, 
Seasonally 
Adjusted 
Industrial 
Production 
Seasonally 
Adjusted 
Data Starts Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 
Norway 
Data Ends Oct 01 Jan 01 Jan 01 Jan 01 Apr 01 
Description 
of Data 
Prices: 
Industrial 
Products 
Reer Based on 
Rnulc 
Treasury 
Bill Rate 
Money, 
Seasonally 
Adjusted 
Industrial 
Production 
Seasonally 
Adjusted 
Data Starts Jan 80 Jan 80 June 84 Jan 80 Jan 80 
Israel 
Data Ends Oct 01 Aug 01 Oct 99 Aug 01 Feb 01 
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Description 
of Data 
No Data Reer Based on 
Rnulc 
New Issue 
Rate: 3 
Months T 
Bills 
M1 
[Datastream] 
No Data 
Data Starts  Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80  
New 
Zealand 
Data Ends  Aug 01 Oct 01 [Feb 
85-April 86 
exclusive] 
Dec 01  
Description 
of Data 
Consumer 
prices 
Reer Based on 
Rnulc 
Call Money 
Rate 
M1 Industrial 
Production 
Seasonally ADJ 
Data Starts Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 
Spain 
Data Ends Oct 01 Oct 01 Oct 01 Dec 98 Sep 01 
Description 
of Data 
Consumer 
prices 
Reer Based on 
Rnulc 
3 Months 
Treasury 
Discount 
Notes 
Money Plus 
Quasi-Money, 
Seasonally 
Adjusted 
Industrial 
Production 
Seasonally 
Adjusted 
Data Starts Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 
Sweden 
Data Ends Oct 01 Oct 01 Aug 01 Dec 00 Jan 00 
Description 
of Data 
Consumer 
Prices 
Reer Based on 
Rnulc 
Call Money 
Rate 
Money, 
Seasonally 
Adjusted 
Industrial 
Production 
Seasonally 
Adjusted 
Data Starts Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 
Denmark 
Data Ends Jan 01 Jan 01 Dec 00 June 00 June 00 
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Description 
of Data 
Consumer 
prices 
Reer Based on 
Rnulc 
Treasury 
bill rate 
M0 Industrial 
Production 
Seasonally 
Adjusted 
Data Starts Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 
United 
Kingdom 
Data Ends Sep 01 Oct 01 Sep 01 Sep 01 Sep 01 
Description 
of Data 
Consumer 
Prices 
Reer Based on 
Rnulc 
Treasury 
Bills: 3 
Months 
M1, 
Seasonally 
Adjusted 
Industrial 
Production, 
Seasonally 
Adjusted 
Data Starts Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 Jan 80 
France 
Data Ends Aug 01 Oct 01 Jan 01 Dec 98 Aug 01 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Comparison Figures 
 
 
Canada - U.S. Difference Figures: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14.a.1 CPI inflation   Figure 14.a.2 CPI inflation std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14.b.1 Exchange rate  Figure 14.b.2 Exchange rate std. dev. 
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Figure 14.c.1 Interest rate   Figure 14.c.2 Interest rate std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14.d.1 Money growth  Figure 14.d.2 Money growth std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14.e.1 Production growth  Figure 14.e.2 Prod. growth std. dev. 
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Canada - U.S. Ratio Figures: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15.a.1 CPI inflation   Figure 15.a.2 CPI inflation std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15.b.1 Exchange rate  Figure 15.b.2 Exchange rate std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15.b.3 Exchange rate (rescaled)   
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Figure 15.c.1 Interest rate   Figure 15.c.2 Interest rate std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15.d.1 Money growth  Figure 15.d.2 Money growth std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15.e.1 Production growth  Figure 15.e.2 Prod. growth std. dev. 
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Figure 15.e.3 Production growth (rescaled) 
CA-US PRODUCTION RATIO-2
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Ja
n-
81
Ja
n-
83
Ja
n-
85
Ja
n-
87
Ja
n-
89
Ja
n-
91
Ja
n-
93
Ja
n-
95
Ja
n-
97
Ja
n-
99
  113 
Finland – Norway Difference Figures: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16.a.1 CPI inflation   Figure 16.a.2 CPI inflation std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16.b.1 Exchange rate  Figure 16.b.2 Exchange rate std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16.c.1 Interest rate   Figure 16.c.2 Interest rate std. dev. 
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Figure 16.d.1 Money growth  Figure 16.d.2 Money growth std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16.e.1 Production growth  Figure 16.e.2 Prod. growth std. dev. 
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Finland – Norway Ratio Figures: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17.a.1 CPI inflation   Figure 17.a.2 CPI inflation std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17.b.1 Exchange rate  Figure 17.b.2 Exchange rate std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17.b.3 Exchange rate (rescaled)  
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Figure 17.c.1 Interest rate   Figure 17.c.2 Interest rate std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17.d.1 Money growth  Figure 17.d.2 Money growth std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17.e.1 Production growth  Figure 17.e.2 Prod. growth std. dev. 
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Figure 17.e.3 Production growth (rescaled)   
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Sweden – Denmark Difference Figures: 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18.a.1 CPI inflation   Figure 18.a.2 CPI inflation std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18.b.1 Exchange rate  Figure 18.b.2 Exchange rate std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18.c.1 Interest rate   Figure 18.c.2 Interest rate std. dev. 
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Figure 18.d.1 Money growth  Figure 18.d.2 Money growth std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18.e.1 Production growth  Figure 18.e.2 Prod. growth std. dev. 
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Sweden – Denmark Ratio Figures: 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19.a.1 CPI inflation   Figure 19.a.2 CPI inflation std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19.b.1 Exchange rate  Figure 19.b.2 Exchange rate std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19.b.3 Exchange rate (rescaled)   
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Figure 19.c.1 Interest rate   Figure 19.c.2 Interest rate std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19.d.1 Money growth  Figure 19.d.2 Money growth std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19.d.3 Money growth(rescaled)   
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Figure 19.e.1 Production growth  Figure 19.e.2 Prod. growth std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19.e.3 Production growth (rescaled)   
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U.K. – France Difference Figures: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20.a.1 CPI inflation   Figure 20.a.2 CPI inflation std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20.b.1 Exchange rate  Figure 20.b.2 Exchange rate std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20.c.1 Interest rate   Figure 20.c.2 Interest rate std. dev. 
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Figure 20.d.1 Money growth  Figure 20.d.2 Money growth std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20.e.1 Production growth  Figure 20.e.2 Prod. growth std. dev. 
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U.K. – France Ratio Figures: 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21.a.1 CPI inflation   Figure 21.a.2 CPI inflation std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21.b.1 Exchange rate  Figure 21.b.2 Exchange rate std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21.b.3 Exchange rate (rescaled) 
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Figure 21.c.1 Interest rate   Figure 21.c.2 Interest rate std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21.d.1 Money growth  Figure 21.d.2 Money growth std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21.d.3 Money growth (rescaled) 
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Figure 21.e.1 Production growth  Figure 21.e.2 Prod. growth std. dev. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21.e.3 Production growth (rescaled)  
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